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Abstract. We propose a new procedure for the risk measurement of large
portfolios. It employs the following objects as the building blocks:
• coherent risk measures introduced by Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath;
• factor risk measures introduced in this paper, which assess the risks driven
by particular factors like the price of oil, S&P500 index, or the credit spread;
• risk contributions and factor risk contributions, which provide a coherent
alternative to the sensitivity coefficients.
We also propose two particular classes of coherent risk measures called Alpha V@R
and Beta V@R, for which all the objects described above admit an extremely simple
empirical estimation procedure. This procedure uses no model assumptions on the
structure of the price evolution.
Moreover, we consider the problem of the risk management on a firm’s level. It
is shown that if the risk limits are imposed on the risk contributions of the desks to
the overall risk of the firm (rather than on their outstanding risks) and the desks
are allowed to trade these limits within a firm, then the desks automatically find
the globally optimal portfolio.
Key words and phrases. Alpha V@R, Beta V@R, capital allocation, coherent
risk measure, extreme measure, factor risk, factor risk contribution, law invariant
risk measure, portfolio optimization, risk contribution, risk management, risk mea-
surement, risk sharing, risk trading, tail correlation, Tail V@R, Weighted V@R.
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1 Introduction
1. Overview. One of the basic problems of finance is: How to measure risk in a proper
way?
Two most well-known and widely used in practice approaches to this problem are
variance and V@R. However, both of them have serious drawbacks. Variance penalizes
high profits in the same way as high losses. Furthermore, the corresponding gain to loss
ratio S(X) = EX
σ(X)
known as the Sharpe ratio does not have the monotonicity property:
X ≤ Y does not imply that S(X) ≤ S(Y ). In particular, an arbitrage possibility might
have a very low Sharpe ratio. Concerning V@R, it takes into account only the quantile
of the distribution without caring about what is happening to the left and to the right
of the quantile. To put it another way, V@R is concerned only with the probability of
the loss and does not care about the size of the loss. However, it is obvious that the
size of the loss should be taken into account. Let us remark in this connection that in
the study of the default risk the main two characteristics of a default are its probability
and its severity. Further criticism of variance and V@R can be found in [4] as well as in
numerous discussions in financial journals.
Recently, a new very promising approach to measure risk was proposed in the landmark
papers by Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath [4], [5] (these are the financial and the
mathematical versions of the same paper). These authors introduced the notion of a
coherent risk measure. Since then, the theory of coherent risk measures has rapidly been
evolving; it already occupies a considerable part of the modern financial mathematics.
Let us cite the papers [1], [2], [3], [6], [16], [19], [24], [27], [28], [30], [36], [41], [43], [52],
[61], to mention only a few. Nice reviews on the theory of coherent risk measures are given
in [20], [29; Ch. 4], [55]. Much of the current research in this area deals with defining
properly a dynamic risk measure (let us mention in this connection the papers [13], [23],
[35], [50], [54]). Currently, more and more research in the theory of coherent risk measures
is related to applications to problems of finance rather than to the study of “pure” risk
measures. In particular, the problem of capital allocation was considered in [6], [14],
[20], [21], [26], [38], [49], [61]; the problem of pricing and hedging was investigated in [8],
[11], [12], [14], [18], [20], [33], [35], [42], [48], [54], [56], [59]; the problem of the optimal
portfolio choice was studied in [15], [51], [53]; the equilibrium problem was considered
in [7], [8], [15], [32], [37], [44]. This list is very far from being complete; for example, on
the Gloria Mundi web page over two hundred papers are related to coherent risk measures.
The investigations mentioned above show that the whole finance can be built based on
coherent risk measures. This is not surprising because risk (≈ uncertainty) is at the very
basis of finance, and a new way of measuring risk yields new approaches to all the basic
problems of finance. In some sources, the theory of coherent risk measures and their
applications is already called the “third revolution in finance” (see [60]).
2. Coherent risk. A coherent risk measure is a functional defined on the space of
random variables that has the following form
ρ(X) = − inf
Q∈D
EQX. (1.1)
Here X means the P&L produced by some portfolio over the unit time period (for exam-
ple, one day) and D is a set of probability measures (all the measures from D are assumed
to be absolutely continuous with respect to the original measure P). From the financial
point of view, ρ(X) is the risk of the portfolio. Formula (1.1) has a straightforward eco-
nomic interpretation: we have a family D of probabilistic scenarios; under each scenario
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we calculate the average P&L; then we take the worst case. Let us remark that typically
a coherent risk measure is defined as a functional on random variables satisfying certain
properties, and the representation theorem states that it should have the form (1.1).
The notion of a coherent risk measure is very convenient theoretically, but when ap-
plying it to practice the following problem arises immediately: How to estimate ρ(X)
empirically? Of course, representation (1.1) cannot be used for the practical calculation;
furthermore, the class of coherent risk measures (= the class of different sets D) is very
wide. Thus, for the practical purposes one needs to select a subclass of coherent risk mea-
sures that admits an easy estimation procedure. One of the best subclasses known so far
is Tail V@R. Tail V@R of order λ ∈ (0, 1] is the coherent risk measure ρλ corresponding
to D = {Q : dQ/dP ≤ λ−1} . It is easy to check that ρλ(X) = −E(X |X ≤ qλ(X)), where
qλ(X) is the λ-quantile of X . Thus, ρλ is a very simple functional. However, the sceptics
can propose the following argument: it is already hard to estimate qλ(X) due to rare tail
data and it is much harder to estimate the tail mean, so the empirical estimation of ρλ is
problematic.
In this paper, we propose a one-parameter family of coherent risk measures, which are
extremely easy to estimate. This is the class of risk measures of the form
ρα(X) = −E min
i=1,...,α
Xi,
where α is a fixed natural number and X1, . . . , Xα are independent copies of X . The
parameter α controls the risk aversion of ρα : the higher is α , the more risk averse is ρα .
We call ρα Alpha V@R. This family of risk measures is a very good substitute for Tail
V@R. It has the following advantages:
• ρα is very intuitive;
• ρα depends on the whole distribution of X and not just on the tail as ρλ ;
• it is very easy to estimate ρα(X) from the time series for X .
Let us remark that for large data sets the empirical estimation of ρα from time series is
faster than the empirical estimation of V@Rλ (!) because it does not require the ordering
of the time series. We believe that ρα is the best one-parameter family of coherent risk
measures.
Alpha V@R is a subclass of the two-parameter family of coherent risk measures, which
we call Beta V@R. This is the class of risk measures of the form
ρα,β(X) = −E
[ β∑
i=1
X(i)
]
,
where β < α are fixed natural numbers and X(1), . . . , X(α) are the order statistics obtained
from the sequence X1, . . . , Xα of independent copies of X . In particular, ρα,1 = ρα . We
believe that ρα,β is the best two-parameter family of coherent risk measures.
3. Factor risk. The theory of coherent risk measures is already rather rich. However,
so far, an important issue has been absent: How to measure the separate risks of a portfolio
induced by factors like the price of oil, S&P 500 index, or the credit spread? Measuring
these risks separately is very important. Suppose, for example, that a significant change
in the price of oil is expected in the near future. Then having a big exposure to the price
of oil is dangerous.
Of course, one might argue at this point that ρ(X) depends on LawX , and this
distribution already takes into account high risk induced by possible oil price moves (as
3
well as all the other risks), so that there is no need to consider separate risks. Our reply to
this possible criticism is as follows. Suppose that we are trying to assess empirically the
risk of a large portfolio. As different assets in a large portfolio have different durations (like
options or bonds), a joint time series for all of them does not exist. So, for the empirical
estimation we should consider the main factors driving the risk, express the values of all
the assets through these factors, and use time series for the factors. Another advantage
of factor risks is as follows. When choosing data for the empirical risk estimation, there
is always a conflict between accuracy and flexibility to the recent changes (the more data
we take, the more accurate are estimates, but less is the flexibility to recent changes).
However, if we are looking for the separate risks driven by separate factors, then this
conflict can be resolved. Namely, for a factor one can take time series whose time step is
stretched according to the current volatility of the factor (for details, see Section 3). This
time change procedure enables one to use arbitrarily large data sets and at the same time
immediately react to the volatility changes.
We propose a way for the coherent measurement of factor risks. Let X be the P&L of a
portfolio produced over a unit time period and Y be the increment of some factor/factors
over this period (Y might be multidimensional). The factor risk of X induced by Y is
defined as
ρf(X ; Y ) = − inf
Q∈E(D|Y )
EQX,
where D is the set standing in (1.1) and
E(D|Y ) := {E(Z |Y ) : Z ∈ D}.
Here we identify measures from D with their densities with respect to P. Thus, ρf ( · ; Y )
is again a coherent risk measure.
It is easy to check that
ρf (X ; Y ) = ρ(E(X |Y )).
This expression clarifies the essence of factor risk: ρf (X ; Y ) takes into account the risk
of X driven only by Y and cuts off all the other risks. The value ρf (X ; Y ) might be
looked at as the coherent counterpart of the sensitivity of X to Y . However, an important
difference from the sensitivity analysis is the non-linearity of ρf (X ; Y ).
The notion of factor risk can be employed in two forms:
1. We take one factor (i.e. Y is one-dimensional), and then ρf measures the risk
induced by this factor.
2. We take all the main factors driving the risk (i.e. Y is multidimensional), and
then ρf measures the “non-diversifiable” risk and serves as a good approximation
to ρ. In other words, we are taking the main factors, express the values of all the
assets in the portfolio through these factors, and look at the coherent risk. This is
a standard procedure of the risk measurement, the only difference is that coherent
risk measures are employed.
A very pleasant feature of ρf is that it is easily calculated for large portfolios. Suppose,
for example, that our portfolio consists of N assets, so that X = X1 + · · ·+XN . Then
ρf
( N∑
n=1
Xn; Y
)
= ρ
( N∑
n=1
fn(Y )
)
,
where fn(y) = E(Xn |Y = y). In order to calculate this value, we need not know the
joint distribution of X1, . . . , XN (if the portfolio consists of several thousands assets,
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finding this distribution is not a very pleasant problem). Instead, we only need the joint
distributions of (Xn, Y ), n = 1, . . . , N . In essence, there is no difference whether our
portfolio consists of 1000 or 1000000 assets because different fn s are joined simply by the
summation procedure.
For coherent factor risks based on Alpha V@R and Beta V@R, we consider an empirical
estimation procedure similar to the historic V@R estimation (for the description of these
methods, see [46; Sect. 6]). This procedure has the following advantages:
• arbitrarily large data sets for factors are available;
• for one-factor risks we can use the time change procedure, which enables one to use
arbitrarily large data sets and immediately react to the volatility changes;
• the procedure is simple and works at the same speed as the historic V@R estimation;
• the use of coherent risk measures is much wiser than the use of V@R;
• the procedure is completely non-linear;
• the procedure employs no model assumptions (except, of course, for those used in
the calculation of E(X |Y = y)).
4. Portfolio optimization. The main message of the first part of the paper is: it is
reasonable to assess the risk of a position not just as a number, but as a vector of factor
risks ρf ( · ; Y 1), . . . , ρf( · ; Y M). We also consider the problem of portfolio optimization
when the constraints on the portfolio are given as ρf (X ; Y m) ≤ cm , m = 1, . . . ,M . It
turns out that this problem admits a simple geometric solution that is similar to the one
given in [15; Subsect. 2.2] for the case of a single constraint ρ(X) ≤ c. We do not insist
that this solution is the one that should be implemented in practice, but it gives a nice
theoretic insight into the form of the optimal portfolio. A possible practical approach to
this problem is also discussed.
5. Risk contribution. The functional ρ measures the outstanding risk of a portfolio.
However, if a big firm assesses the risk of a trade, it should take into account not the
outstanding risk of the trade, but rather its impact on the risk of the whole firm. Thus, if
the P&L of the trade is X and the P&L produced over the same period by the whole firm
is W , the quantity of interest is ρ(W + X) − ρ(W ). If X is small as compared to W ,
then a good approximation to this difference is the risk contribution of X to W . The
notion of risk contribution based on coherent risk measures was considered in [21], [26],
[38], [49], [61]. In this paper, we are taking the definition proposed in [14; Subsect. 2.5].
One of equivalent definitions of the coherent risk contribution ρf (X ;W ) of X to W is
ρc(X ;W ) = lim
ε↓0
ε−1(ρ(W + εX)− ρ(W )).
Note that if X is small as compared to W , then
ρ(W +X)− ρ(W ) ≈ ρc(X ;W ).
In most typical situations ρc admits the representation
ρc(X ;W ) = −EQX,
where Q is the extreme measure defined as argminQ∈D EQW (D is the set standing
in (1.1)). Note that in this case ρf is linear in X .
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For the most important classes of coherent risk measures, risk contribution admits a
simple empirical estimation procedure. As shown in the paper, for Alpha V@R, ρc has
the following form:
ρcα(X ;W ) = −EXargmin
i=1,...,α
Wi,
where (X1,W1), . . . , (Xα,Wα) are independent copies of (X,W ). In particular, it is not
hard to compute this quantity for the typical case, where the firm’s portfolio consists of
many assets, i.e. W =
∑N
n=1W
n with a large number N . A similar simple representation
is provided for the Beta V@R risk contribution.
We also provide formulas for the empirical estimation of risk contributions for the
class of risk measures, which we call Weighted V@R (the term spectral risk measures is
also used in the literature); this is a wide class containing, in particular, Beta V@R.
We also study the properties of the coefficient
κ(X ;W ) =
uc(X ;W )
u(X)
.
which measures the tail correlation between X and W .
6. Factor risk contribution. In this paper, we introduce the notion of factor risk
contribution. It is simply the risk contribution applied to the risk measure ρf , i.e
ρfc(X ; Y ;W ) = lim
ε↓0
ε−1(ρf(W + εX ; Y )− ρf (W ; Y )).
The quantity ρfc( · ;W ; Y ) may be viewed as a coherent alternative to the sensitivity
coefficient. There are, however, two important differences:
• The sensitivity coefficient is a nice estimate of risk provided that the change in the
corresponding factor is small (i.e. Y is small). On the other hand, the factor risk
contribution is a nice estimate of risk provided that X is small as compared to W
and there are no requirements on the size of Y .
• The sensitivity coefficient measures the sensitivity of a portfolio to a market factor.
On the other hand, the factor risk contribution measures the sensitivity of a portfo-
lio X both to the market factor Y and to the firm’s portfolio W . So, ρfc( · ; Y ;W )
is a “firm-specific” coherent sensitivity to the factor Y .
As shown in the paper,
ρfc(X ; Y ;W ) = ρc(E(X |Y );E(W |Y )).
This formula reduces the computation of ρfc to two steps: calculating the functions
f(y) = E(X |Y = y), g(y) = E(W |Y = y) and computing ρc .
7. Risk sharing. The relevance of factor risk contributions becomes clear from
our considerations of the risk sharing problem. One of the basic problems of the central
management of a firm consisting of several desks is: How to impose the limits on the
risk of each desk? Typically, this problem is approached as follows. By looking at the
performance of each desk, the central management decides which desks should grow and
which ones should shrink and chooses the risk limits accordingly. Nowadays, the procedure
of choosing the risk limits is to a large extent a political one. At the same time, the central
managers would like to have a quantitative rather than political procedure of choosing
these limits. An idea proposed by practitioners is: Instead of giving each desk a fixed risk
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limit, it might be reasonable to allow the desks to trade the risk limits between themselves.
For example, if one desk is not using its risk limit completely, it might sell the excess risk
limit to another desk, which needs it.
In this paper we address the following problem: Is it possible to arrange a market of
risk within a firm in such a way that the resulting competitive optimum would coincide
with the global one? (By the global optimum we mean the one attained if the central
management had possessed all the information available to all the desks and had been able
to solve the corresponding global optimization problem.) The hope of the positive answer
is justified by a well-known equivalence established in the expected utility framework
between the global optimum (known also as the Pareto-type or the soviet-type optimum)
and the competitive optimum (known also as the Arrow–Debreu-type or the western-type
optimum); see [40]. A coherent risk counterpart of this result was established in [15;
Sect. 4]. The difference between these results and our setting is that here the objects
traded are risk limits rather than financial contracts. The results of this paper (they are
established within the coherent risk framework) are as follows:
• If the desks are measuring their outstanding risks and are keeping them within the
risk limits, then the competitive optimum is not the global one.
• If the desks are keeping track of their risk contributions to the whole firm, then the
competitive optimum coincides with the global one.
Moreover, it turns out that the global optimum is achieved regardless of what the initial
allocation of risk limits between the desks is. (By the initial allocation we mean the
risk limits given to the desks by the central management before the desks start to trade
their risk limits.) Our result applies not only to the case of one risk constraint on the
firm’s portfolio, but also to the case of several risk constraints (a typical example is the
constraints on each factor risk).
8. Structure of the paper. In essence, the paper consists of two parts. The first
part (Sections 2–4) deals with factor risk. In Section 2, we recall basic facts and examples
related to coherent risk measures. Section 3 deals with factor risk. In Section 4, we
study the problem of portfolio optimization under limits imposed on factor risks. The
second part (Sections 5–7) deals with (factor) risk contribution. In Section 5, we recall
basic facts related to risk contribution. Section 6 deals with factor risk contribution. In
Section 7, we study the problem of risk sharing between the desks of a firm. The Appendix
contains the L0 -version of the Kusuoka theorem, which is needed for some statements of
the paper and is of interest by itself. The recipes for the practical risk measurement are
gathered in Section 8, where we also compare various empirical risk estimation techniques
considered in this paper with the classical ones like parametric V@R, Monte Carlo V@R,
and historic V@R. The reader interested in practical applications only might proceed
directly to Section 8.
Acknowledgement. A. Cherny expresses his thanks to D. Heath and S. Hilden for
the fruitful discussions related to the risk sharing problem.
2 Coherent Risk
1. Basic definitions and facts. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space. It is convenient to
consider instead of coherent risk measures their opposites called coherent utility functions.
This enables one to get rid of numerous minus signs. Recall that L∞ is the space of
bounded random variables on (Ω,F ,P).
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The following definition was introduced in [4], [5], [19].
Definition 2.1. A coherent utility function on L∞ is a map u : L∞ → R satisfying
the properties:
(a) (Superadditivity) u(X + Y ) ≥ u(X) + u(Y );
(b) (Monotonicity) If X ≤ Y , then u(X) ≤ u(Y );
(c) (Positive homogeneity) u(λX) = λu(X) for λ ∈ R+ ;
(d) (Translation invariance) u(X +m) = u(X) +m for m ∈ R;
(e) (Fatou property) If |Xn| ≤ 1, Xn P−→ X , then u(X) ≥ lim supn u(Xn).
The corresponding coherent risk measure is ρ(X) = −u(X).
Remarks. (i) From the financial point of view, X means the P&L produced by some
portfolio over the unit time period (taken as the basis for risk measurement) and dis-
counted to the initial time. Actually, all the financial quantities in this paper are the
discounted ones. However, the unit time period is typically small (for example, one day),
and for such time horizons the discounted values are very close to the actual ones. For
this reason, below we skip the word “discounted”.
(ii) The superadditivity property of u (= the subadditivity of ρ) has the following
financial meaning: if we have a portfolio consisting of several subportfolios and the risk
of each subportfolio is small, then the risk of the whole portfolio is small. V@R satisfies
all the conditions of the above definition except for the subadditivity, and this leads to
serious drawbacks of V@R. This can be illustrated by a simple example proposed in [4].
Suppose that a portfolio consists of 25 subportfolios (corresponding to several agents), i.e.
its P&L X equals
∑25
n=1X
n . Suppose that Xn = I(An)c − 100IAn , where P(Ai) = 1/25
and A1, . . . , A25 are disjoint sets ((An)c denotes the complement of An ). This means
that each agent employs a spiking strategy. If risk is measured by V@R0.05 , then the risk
of each subportfolio is negative (meaning that each subportfolio is extremely good from
the viewpoint of this risk measure), while the P&L produced by the whole portfolio is
identically equal to −76!
A natural example, in which V@R is subadditive, is the Gaussian case: if X, Y have
a jointly Gaussian distribution, then V@Rλ(X + Y ) ≤ V@Rλ(X) + V@Rλ(Y ). But
actually on the set of (centered) Gaussian variables all the reasonable risk measures like
V@R, variance, any law invariant coherent risk measure (see Example 2.7) coincide up
to multiplication by a positive constant. However, for general random variables this is
not the case, V@R and variance exhibit serious drawbacks (see [4]), and coherent risk
measures are really needed. ✷
The theorem below is the basic representation theorem. It was established in [5] for
the case of a finite Ω (in this case the axiom (e) is not needed) and in [19] for the general
case (the proof can also be found in [29; Cor. 4.35] or [55; Cor. 1.17]). We denote by P
the set of probability measures on F that are absolutely continuous with respect to P.
Throughout the paper, we identify measures from P (these are typically denoted by Q)
with their densities with respect to P (these are typically denoted by Z ).
Theorem 2.2. A function u satisfies conditions (a)–(e) if and only if there exists a
non-empty set D ⊆ P such that
u(X) = inf
Q∈D
EQX, X ∈ L∞. (2.1)
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Remarks. (i) Let us emphasize that a coherent risk measure is defined on random
variables and not on their distributions. Using representation (2.1), it is easy to construct
an example of a risk measure ρ and two random variables X and Y with LawX = Law Y ,
but with ρ(X) 6= ρ(Y ). A particularly important subclass of coherent risk measures is the
class of law invariant ones, i.e. the risk measures ρ that depend only on the distribution
of X . However, it would not be a nice idea to include law invariance as the sixth axiom in
Definition 2.1. Indeed, the basic risk measure used by an agent is typically law invariant.
But there are many “derivative” risk measures like ρf( · ; Y ) (many examples of naturally
arising “derivative” risk measures can be found in [14], [15], [20]), and these ones need
not be law invariant even if the basic risk measure ρ is law invariant.
(ii) Coherent risk measures are primarily aimed at measuring risk. But they can be
used to measure the risk-adjusted performance as well. The risk-adjusted performance
based on coherent risk is a functional of the form p(X) = EX − λρ(X), where ρ is a
coherent risk measure and λ ∈ R+ . (By E we will always denote the expectation with
respect to the original measure P.) Note that the functional X 7→ EX is a coherent
utility (it is sufficient to take D = {P} in (2.1)). Furthermore, if
un(X) = inf
Q∈Dn
EQX, n = 1, 2
are two coherent utilities and λ ∈ [0, 1], then
λu1(X) + (1− λ)u2(X) = inf
Q∈λD1+(1−λ)D2
EQX
is also a coherent utility (we use the notation λD1+(1−λ)D2 = {λQ1+(1−λ)Q2 : Qn ∈ Dn}).
Thus, (1 + λ)−1p(X) is again a coherent utility, which is a very convenient “stability”
feature. As a result, coherent utility/risk can be used
1. to measure risk;
2. to measure the risk-adjusted performance, i.e. utility.
(iii) Coherent utility may serve as a substitute for the classical expected utility. The
techniques like utility-indifference pricing, utility-based optimization, utility-based equi-
librium, etc. can be transferred from the expected utility framework to the coherent
utility framework. Note that the intersection of these two classes of utility is trivial: it
consists only of the functional X 7→ EX (note that all the other expected utilities do not
satisfy the translation invariance property).
(iv) A generalization of coherent utility is the notion of concave utility introduced by
Fo¨llmer and Schied [27], [28]. A functional u : L∞ → R is a concave utility function if it
satisfies the axioms (b), (d), (e) of Definition 2.1 as well as the condition
(a’) (Concavity) u(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≥ λu(X) + (1− λ)u(Y ) for λ ∈ [0, 1].
The corresponding convex risk measure is ρ(X) = −u(X). The representation theorem
states that u is a concave utility function if and only there exists a non-empty set D ⊆ P
and a function α : D → R such that
u(X) = inf
Q∈D
(EQX + α(Q)), X ∈ L∞
(the proof can be found in [27], [29; Th. 4.31], or [55; Th. 1.13]). A natural example of a
concave utility function is
u(X) = sup
{
m ∈ R : inf
Q∈D
EQU(X −m) ≥ x0
}
, X ∈ L∞,
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where U : R → R is a concave increasing function, D ⊆ P , and x0 ∈ R is a fixed
threshold. This object is closely connected with the robust version of the Savage theory
developed by Gilboa and Schmeidler [31]. For a detailed study of these concave utilities,
see [28], [29; Sect. 4.9], or [55; Sect. 1.6].
The theory of convex risk measures is now a rather large field. However, in applications
to problems of finance like pricing and optimization, coherent risk measures turn out to
be much more convenient than the convex ones. For this reason, we will consider only
coherent risk measures. ✷
So far, a coherent risk measure has been defined on bounded random variables. Let us
ask ourselves the following question: Are “financial” random variables like the increment
of a price of some asset indeed bounded? The right way to address this question is to
split it into two parts:
• Are “financial” random variables bounded in practice?
• Are “financial” random variables bounded in theory?
The answer to the first question is positive (clearly, everything is bounded by the number
of the atoms in the universe). The answer to the second question is negative because
most distributions used in theory (like the lognormal one) are unbounded. So, as we
are dealing with theory, we need to extend coherent risk measures to the space L0 of all
random variables.
It is hopeless to axiomatize the notion of a risk measure on L0 and then to obtain
the corresponding representation theorem. Instead, following [14], we take representa-
tion (2.1) as the basis and extend it to L0 .
Definition 2.3. A coherent utility function on L0 is a map u : L0 → [−∞,∞] defined
as
u(X) = inf
Q∈D
EQX, X ∈ L0, (2.2)
where D is a non-empty subset of P and EQX is understood as EQX+ − EQX−
(X+ = max{X, 0} , X− = max{−X, 0}) with the convention ∞−∞ = −∞ . (Through-
out the paper, all the expectations are understood in this way.)
Remark. This way of defining coherent utility has parallels to what is done with the
classical expected utility. Namely, the Von Neumann–Morgenstern representation shows
that (appropriately axiomatized) investor’s preferences are described by EU(X) with a
bounded function U . Then one typically takes a concave increasing unbounded function
U : R→ R and defines the preferences by EU(X). ✷
Clearly, different sets D might define the same coherent utility (for example, D and
its convex hull define the same function u). However, among all the sets D defining the
same u there exists the largest one. It is given by {Q ∈ P : EQX ≥ u(X) for any X} .
Definition 2.4. We will call the largest set, for which (2.1) (resp., (2.2)) is true, the
determining set of u .
Remarks. (i) Let ρ′ be another coherent utility with the determining set D′ . Clearly,
D′ ⊇ D ⇐⇒ ρ′ ≥ ρ.
In other words, the size of D controls the risk aversion of ρ.
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(ii) The determining set is convex. For coherent utilities on L∞ , it is also L1 -closed
(for the corresponding example, see [14; Subsect. 2.1]). In particular, the determining
set of a coherent utility on L0 and the determining set of its restriction to L∞ might be
different.
(iii) Let D be an L1 -closed convex subset of P . (Let us note that a particularly
important case is where D is L1 -closed, convex, and uniformly integrable; this condition
will be needed in a number of places below.) Define a coherent utility u by (2.2). Then D
is the determining set of u . Indeed, assume that the determining set D˜ is larger than D ,
i.e. there exists Q0 ∈ D˜ \ D . Then, by the Hahn–Banach theorem, we can find X0 ∈ L∞
such that EQ0X0 < infQ∈D EQX , which is a contradiction. The same argument shows that
D is also the determining set of the restriction of u to L∞ . ✷
In what follows, we will always consider coherent utility functions on L0 .
2. Examples. Let us now provide several natural examples of coherent risk measures.
Example 2.5 (Tail V@R). Let λ ∈ (0, 1] and consider
Dλ =
{
Q ∈ P : dQ
dP
≤ λ−1
}
. (2.3)
The corresponding coherent risk measure is called Tail V@R (the terms Average V@R,
Conditional V@R, Expected Shortfall, and Expected Tail Loss are also used). Let us denote
it by ρλ and the corresponding coherent utility by uλ .
Clearly,
λ′ ≤ λ ⇐⇒ ρλ′ ≥ ρλ,
so that λ serves as the risk aversion parameter. We have
ρλ(X) −−→
λ↓0
− essinf
ω
X(ω)
(recall that essinfωX(ω) := sup{x : X ≥ x a.s.}). The right-hand side of this relation is
the most severe risk measure (it is easy to see that any coherent risk measure ρ satisfies
the inequality ρ(X) ≤ − essinfωX(ω)). Furthermore, ρ1(X) = −EX , which is the most
liberal risk measure (it is seen from Theorem A.1 that any law invariant risk measure ρ
satisfies the inequality ρ(X) ≥ −EX ).
Let us provide a more explicit representation of uλ . Set
Z∗ = λ
−1I(X < qλ(X)) +
1− λ−1P(X < qλ(X))
P(X = qλ(X))
I(X = qλ(X)).
Throughout the paper, qλ will denote the right λ-quantile, i.e.
qλ(X) = inf{x : F (x) ≥ λ} , where F is the distribution function of X . Then
Z∗ ≥ 0, EZ∗ = 1 and, for any Z ∈ Dλ , we have
EXZ − EXZ∗ = E(X − qλ(X))Z − E(X − qλ(X))Z∗
= E[(X − qλ(X))(Z − λ−1)I(X − qλ(X) < 0)
+ (X − qλ(X))ZI(X − qλ(X) > 0)] ≥ 0.
Hence,
uλ(X) = EXZ∗ = λ
−1
∫
(−∞,qλ(X))
xQ(dx) + (1− λ−1P(X < qλ(X))qλ(X), (2.4)
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where Q = LawX . In particular, it follows that uλ is law invariant, i.e. it depends
only on the distribution of X . If X has a continuous distribution, then this formula is
simplified to:
uλ(X) = E(X |X ≤ qλ(X)).
Using (2.4), one easily gets an equivalent representation of uλ :
uλ(X) = λ
−1
∫ λ
0
qx(X)dx. (2.5)
It is seen from this representation that ρλ(X) ≥ V@Rλ(X). The advantage of Tail
V@R over V@R is that it takes into account the heaviness of the λ-tail (see Figure 1).
Kusuoka [41] proved that on L∞ , ρλ is the smallest law invariant coherent risk measure
that dominates V@Rλ (the proof can also be found in [29; Th. 4.61] or [55; Th. 1.48]).
This suggests an opinion that Tail V@R might be the most important subclass of coherent
risk measures. However, there exists a risk measure, which is in our opinion much better
than Tail V@R. This is the risk measure of the next example. ✷
✲
✻
✲
✻
qλ qλ
Figure 1. These two distributions have the same λ-quantiles (λ is
fixed), so that V@Rλ is the same for them. However, the distribution
at the right is clearly “better” than the distribution at the left.
Example 2.6 (Weighted V@R). Let µ be a probability measure on (0, 1].
Weighted V@R with the weighting measure µ (the term spectral risk measure is also
used) is the coherent risk measure corresponding to the coherent utility function
uµ(X) =
∫
(0,1]
uλ(X)µ(dλ),
where
∫
f(x)µ(dx) is understood as
∫
f+(x)µ(dx) − ∫ f−(x)µ(dx) with the convention
∞−∞ = −∞ . (Throughout the paper, all the integrals are understood in this way.) One
can check that uµ is indeed a coherent utility (see [16; Sect. 3] for details). The measure
µ reflects the risk aversion of ρµ : the more is the mass of µ attributed to the left part of
(0, 1], the more risk averse is ρµ .
Let us give two arguments in favor of Weighted V@R over Tail V@R:
• (Financial argument) Tail V@R of order λ takes into consideration only the λ-tail of
the distribution of X ; thus, two distributions with the same λ-tail will be assessed
by this measure in the same way, although one of them might be clearly better than
the other (see Figure 2). On the other hand, if the right endpoint of the support
of µ is 1, then ρµ depends on the whole distribution of X . The paper [24] provides
some further financial arguments in favor of Weighted V@R.
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• (Mathematical argument) If the support of µ is the whole [0, 1], then ρµ possesses
some nice properties that are not shared by ρλ . In particular, if X and Y are not
comonotone (for the definition, see Section 5), then ρµ(X + Y ) < ρµ(X) + ρµ(Y )
(the proof can be found in [16; Sect. 5], where this was called the strict diversi-
fication property). This property is important because it leads to the uniqueness
of a solution of several optimization problems based on Weighted V@R (see [16;
Sect. 5]).
To put it briefly, Weighted V@R is “smoother” than Tail V@R.
✲
✻
✲
✻
qλ qλ
Figure 2. These two distributions have the same λ-tails (λ is fixed),
so that TV@Rλ is the same for them. However, the distribution at
the right is clearly “better” than the distribution at the left.
Weighted V@R is law invariant because Tail V@R possesses this property.
Kusuoka [41] proved that on L∞ the class of Weighted V@Rs is exactly the class of
law invariant coherent risk measures satisfying the additional property of comonotonicity,
which means that ρ(X+Y ) = ρ(X)+ρ(Y ) for any comonotone (the definition is recalled
in Section 5) random variables X and Y (the proof can also be found in [29; Th. 4.87]
or [55; Th. 1.58]).
Let us now provide several equivalent representations of Weighted V@R. It follows
from (2.5) that
uµ(X) =
∫
(0,1]
λ−1
∫ λ
0
qx(X)dxµ(dλ) =
∫ 1
0
qx(X)ψµ(x)dx, (2.6)
where
ψµ(x) =
∫
[x,1]
λ−1µ(dλ), x ∈ [0, 1]. (2.7)
The last formula establishes a one-to-one correspondence between the left-continuous
decreasing functions ψ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] with ∫
(0,1]
ψ(x)dx = 1 and the probability measures
on (0, 1].
In particular, let Ω = {1, . . . , T} and X(t) = xt . Let x(1), . . . , x(T ) be the values
x1, . . . , xT in the increasing order. Define n(t) through the equality x(t) = xn(t) . Then
uµ(X) =
T∑
t=1
xn(t)
∫ zt
zt−1
ψµ(x)dx, (2.8)
where zt =
∑t
i=1 P{n(i)} . This formula yields a simple procedure of the empirical esti-
mation of uµ(X).
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In order to provide another representation of uµ , consider the function
Ψµ(x) =
∫ x
0
ψµ(y)dy =
∫ x
0
∫
(y,1]
λ−1µ(dλ)dy, x ∈ (0, 1]. (2.9)
It is easy to see that Ψµ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is increasing, concave, continuous, Ψµ(0) = 0,
and Ψµ(1) = 1. In fact, (2.9) establishes a one-to-one correspondence between the func-
tions with these properties and the probability measures µ on (0, 1] (for details, see [29;
Lem. 4.63] or [55; Lem. 1.50]). The inverse map Ψ 7→ µ is given by µ = −λΨ′′ , where
Ψ′′ is the second derivative of Ψ taken in the sense of distributions, i.e. it is the measure
on (0, 1] defined by Ψ′′((a, b]) := Ψ′+(b)−Ψ′+(a), where Ψ′+ is the right-hand derivative.
Let F be the distribution function of X . As the function x 7→ qx(X) is constant on the
intervals of the form [F (y−), F (y)), we can derive from (2.5) the following representation:
uµ(X) =
∫ 1
0
qx(X)dΨµ(x) =
∫
R
qF (x)(X)dΨµ(F (x)) =
∫
R
xdΨµ(F (x)) = EY, (2.10)
where Y is a random variable with the distribution function Ψµ ◦F . This representation
provides a convenient tool for designing particular risk measures. Let us remark that
the functionals of the form (2.10) were considered by actuaries under the name distorted
measures already in the early 90s, i.e. before the papers of Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and
Heath; see, for example, [22], [62] (see also the paper [63], which appeared at the same
time as [4]).
If X has a continuous distribution, we get from (2.10) one more representation:
uµ(X) =
∫
R
xψµ(F (x))dF (x) = EXψµ(X) = EQµ(X)X, (2.11)
where Qµ(X) = ψµ(X)P. Note that
Eψµ(F (X)) =
∫
R
ψµ(F (x))dF (x) =
∫ 1
0
ψµ(x)dx =
∫
(0,1]
∫ λ
0
λ−1dxµ(dλ) = 1,
so that Qµ(X) is a probability measure. As ψµ ◦F is decreasing, this measure attributes
more mass to the outcomes corresponding to low values of X . Thus, Qµ(X) reflects the
risk aversion of an agent who possesses the position that yields the P&L X .
The determining set Dµ of uµ admits the following representation:
Dµ = {Z ∈ L0 : Z ≥ 0, EZ = 1, and E(Z − x)+ ≤ Φµ(x) ∀x ∈ R+}, (2.12)
where
Φµ(x) = sup
y∈[0,1]
(Ψµ(y)− xy), x ∈ R+ (2.13)
(see [16; Th. 4.6]). Note that Φµ : R+ → R+ is continuous, decreasing, convex, Φµ(0) = 1,
Φµ(x) > 0 for x <
∫
(0,1]
λ−1dµ , and Φµ(x) = 0 for x ≥
∫
(0,1]
λ−1dµ .
One more representation of Dµ is:
Dµ = {Q ∈ P : Q(A) ≤ Ψµ(P(A)) for any A ∈ F}
=
{
Z ∈ L0 : Z ≥ 0, EPZ = 1, and
∫ 1
1−x
qs(Z)ds ≤ Ψµ(x) ∀x ∈ [0, 1]
}
.
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✲✻∫
(0,1]
λ−1dµ
10 x
ψµ
✲
✻
1
0 1 x
∫
(0,1]
λ−1dµ
Ψµ
✲
✻
1
0 x
∫
(0,1]
λ−1dµ
Φµ
Figure 3. The form of ψµ , Ψµ , and Φµ
It was obtained in [10] (the proof can also be found in [29; Th. 4.73] or [55; Th. 1.53]). It
is seen from this representation that
Ψµ′ ≥ Ψµ ⇐⇒ ρµ′ ≥ ρµ. (2.14)
Moreover, it is easy to see that
µ′ 4 µ =⇒ ρµ′ ≥ ρµ, (2.15)
where the notation µ′ 4 µ means that µ stochastically dominates µ′ , i.e. their distri-
bution functions satisfy Fµ′ ≥ Fµ . In order to prove (2.15), it is sufficient to notice that
uλ is increasing in λ and uµ(X) = E˜uξ(X), where ξ is a random variable on some space
(Ω˜, F˜ , P˜) with Law ξ = µ . One should also use the following well-known fact (see [57;
§ 1.A]): µ′ 4 µ if and only on some space there exist ξ′ ≤ ξ with Law ξ = µ , Law ξ′ = µ′ .
For more information on Weighted V@R, see [1], [2], [16], [24]. ✷
Weighted V@R is a particular case of the more general class of risk measures that is
described in the next example.
Example 2.7 (Law invariant risk measures). A risk measure ρ is law invariant
if ρ(X) = ρ(Y ) whenever LawX = Law Y . Kusuoka [41] proved that a coherent risk
measure ρ on L∞ is law invariant if and only if it has the form
ρ(X) = sup
µ∈M
ρµ(X)
with some set M of probability measures on (0, 1] (the proof can also be found in [29;
Cor. 4.58] or [55; Cor. 1.45]). Theorem A.1 extends this result to risk measures on L0 . ✷
An interesting two-parameter family of coherent risk measures is provided by the
example below.
Example 2.8 (Moment-based risk measures). Let p ∈ [1,∞] and α ∈ [0, 1].
Consider the set
D = {1 + α(Z − EZ) : Z ≥ 0, ‖Z‖q ≤ 1},
where q = p/(p−1) and ‖Z‖q = (EZq)1/q . Then the corresponding coherent risk measure
has the form
ρ(X) = −EX + α‖(X − EX)−‖p
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(see [20; Sect. 4]). In particular, if p = 2, α = 1, and EX = 0, then ρ(X) is the
semivariance of X . Semivariance was proposed by Markowitz [45] as a substitute for
variance. Its advantage is that it measures really risk (i.e. the downfall); its disadvantage
is that it is less convenient analytically than variance. ✷
The moment-based risk measures are law invariant, but they do not belong to the class
of Weighted V@Rs, which is a very convenient class. Weighted V@Rs are parametrized
by the probability measures µ on (0, 1], which is a huge class. For the practical purposes,
one needs to select a convenient finite-parameter subclass of Weighted V@Rs. The most
natural parametric family of probability measures on [0, 1] is the family of Beta distri-
butions. It turns out that the family of corresponding Weighted V@Rs admits a very
natural interpretation and a very simple estimation procedure. We call these measures
Beta V@Rs in accordance with Beta distributions.
Example 2.9 (Beta V@R). Let α ∈ (−1,∞), β ∈ (−1, α). Beta V@R with pa-
rameters α, β is the Weighted V@R with the weighting measure
µα,β(dx) = B(β + 1, α− β)−1xβ(1− x)α−β−1dx, x ∈ [0, 1].
This risk measure will be denoted as ρα,β and the corresponding coherent utility will be
denoted as uα,β .
It follows from (2.15) that
α′ ≥ α ⇐⇒ µα′,β 4 µα,β ⇐⇒ ρα′,β ≥ ρα,β , (2.16)
β ′ ≥ β ⇐⇒ µα,β′ < µα,β ⇐⇒ ρα,β′ ≤ ρα,β . (2.17)
Furthermore,
µα,β −−−→
α→∞
δ0 =⇒ ρα,β(X) −−−→
α→∞
− essinf
ω
X(ω),
µα,β −−→
β↑α
δ1 =⇒ ρα,β(X) −−→
β↑α
−EX,
where δa denotes the delta-mass concentrated at a. In particular, these relations show
that we can redefine ρα,α(X) as −EX .
Suppose now that α, β ∈ N. Let X1, . . . , Xα be independent copies of X ,
X(1), . . . , X(α) be the corresponding order statistics, and ξ be an independent uniformly
distributed on {1, . . . , β} random variable. Let us prove that
ρα,β(X) = −EX(ξ) = −E
[ 1
β
β∑
i=1
X(i)
]
. (2.18)
The second equality is obvious, so we should prove only the first one. The random
variables Xi can be realized as Xi = F
−1(Ui), where F is the distribution function of X
and U1, . . . , Uα are independent uniformly distributed on [0, 1] random variables. Let
U(1), . . . , U(α) denote their order statistics. We have (see [25; Ch. 1, § 7])
d
dx
P(U(i) ≤ x) = αC i−1α−1xi−1(1− x)α−i, x ∈ (0, 1),
so that
d
dx
P(U(ξ) ≤ x) = 1
β
β∑
i=1
d
dx
P(U(i) ≤ x) = α
β
β∑
i=1
C i−1α−1x
i−1(1− x)α−i, x ∈ (0, 1)
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and
d2
dx2
P(U(ξ) ≤ x) = − α!
β!(α− β − 1)!x
β−1(1− x)α−β−1, x ∈ (0, 1).
For the function Ψα,β := Ψµα,β , we have
Ψ′′α,β(x) = −x−1B(β + 1, α− β)−1xβ(1− x)α−β−1dx =
d2
dx2
P(U(ξ) ≤ x), x ∈ (0, 1).
Moreover, the functions Ψα,β and P(U(ξ) ≤ ·) coincide at 0 and at 1. Consequently, these
functions are equal, and therefore,
P(X(ξ) ≤ x) = P(F−1(U(ξ)) ≤ x) = P(U(ξ) ≤ F (x)) = Ψα,β(F (x)), x ∈ R.
Recalling (2.10), we obtain (2.18).
It is seen from the calculations given above that for Beta V@R the function
ψα,β := ψµα,β has the form
ψα,β(x) = Ψ
′
α,β(x) =
d
dx
P(U(ξ) ≤ x) = α
β
β∑
i=1
C i−1α−1x
i−1(1− x)α−i, x ∈ (0, 1). (2.19)
Let us remark that, according to (2.5), Tail V@R admits the following representation:
ρλ(X) = E˜qξ(X), where ξ is a random variable on some space (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜) with the uniform
distribution on [0, λ]. Formula (2.18) can be rewritten as follows: ρα,β(X) = −E˜qξ(X˜),
where X˜ is a random variable distributed according to the empirical distribution con-
structed by X1, . . . , Xα , ξ is an independent random variable with the uniform distribu-
tion on [0, β/α], and E˜ means the averaging over empirical distributions. ✷
An important one-parameter family of coherent risk measures is obtained from Beta
V@R by fixing the value β = 1.
Example 2.10 (Alpha V@R). Let α ∈ (1,∞). Alpha V@R of order α is Beta
V@R of order (α, 1). It is seen from (2.16) that α measures the risk aversion of ρα .
Furthermore, it follows from (2.18) that, for α ∈ N,
ρα(X) = −E min
i=1,...,α
Xi, (2.20)
where X1, . . . , Xα are independent copies of X . ✷
The classes of risk measures described by Examples 2.5–2.10 are related by the follow-
ing diagram:
Tail
V@R ⊂
Weighted
V@R ⊂
Law-invariant
risk measures ⊂
Coherent
risk measures
⊂ ⊂
Beta
V@R
Moment-based
risk measures
⊂
Alpha
V@R
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In our opinion, the best classes are: Weighted V@R, Beta V@R, and Alpha V@R. All the
empirical estimation procedures considered in the paper will be provided for these three
classes.
3. Further examples. Coherent risk measures are primarily intended to assess the
risk of non-Gaussian P&Ls. However, as an example, it is interesting to look at their
values in the Gaussian case.
Example 2.11. (i) Let u be a law invariant coherent utility that is finite on Gaussian
random variables. It is easy to see that then there exists γ ∈ R+ such that, for any
Gaussian random variable X with mean m and variance σ2 , we have u(X) = m−γσ . In
particular, if X is a d-dimensional Gaussian random vector with mean 0 and covariance
matrix C , then ρ(〈h,X〉) = γ〈h, Ch〉 , h ∈ Rd .
(ii) For Tail V@R, we get an explicit form of the constant γ :
γ(λ) = − 1
λ
√
2pi
∫ qλ
−∞
xe−x
2/2dx =
1
λ
√
2pi
∫ ∞
q2
λ
/2
e−ydy =
1
λ
√
2pi
e−q
2
λ
/2,
where qλ is the λ-quantile of the standard normal distribution (in order to check the
second equality, one should consider separately the cases λ ≤ 1/2 and λ ≥ 1/2).
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
✲
✻
λ
γ(λ)
Figure 4. The form of γ(λ)
(iii) For Beta V@R, we have from (ii):
γ(α, β) =
∫ 1
0
1√
2piB(β + 1, α− β) e
−q2x/2xβ−1/2(1− x)α−β−1dx.
5 10 15 20
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1.25
1.5
1.75
✲
✻
α
γ(α, 5)
γ(α, 4)
γ(α, 3)
γ(α, 2)
γ(α, 1)
Figure 5. The form of γ(α, β)
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Let us also give a nice credit risk example, which illustrates the effect of coherent risk
diversification achieved in large portfolios. The example is borrowed from [20].
Example 2.12. Let µ be a measure on (0, 1] such that
∫
(0,1]
λ−1µ(dλ) < ∞ (for
example, the weighting measures of Tail V@R, Beta V@R with β > 0, and Alpha V@R
satisfy this condition). Let X1, X2, . . . be independent identically distributed integrable
random variables. Set Sn = X1 + · · ·+Xn . By the law of large numbers, Sn/n L
1−→ EX .
Consequently, uλ(Sn/n) → EX for any λ ∈ (0, 1]. Using the estimate |uλ(ξ)| ≤ λ−1E|ξ|
and the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem, we get
uµ
(Sn
n
)
=
∫
(0,1]
uλ
(Sn
n
)
µ(dλ) −−−→
n→∞
∫
(0,1]
uλ(EX)µ(dλ) = EX.
This result admits the following interpretation. If a firm gives many loans of size L to
independent identical customers (so that the n-th customer returns back the random
amount Xn ), then the firm is on the safe side provided that EX ≥ L. ✷
4. Empirical estimation. Here we will describe procedures for the empirical estima-
tion of Alpha V@R, Beta V@R, and Weighted V@R, which serve as coherent counterparts
of the historic V@R estimation (see [46; Sect. 6]). Let X be the increment of the value
of some portfolio over the unit time period ∆.
In order to estimate Alpha V@R with α ∈ N, one should first choose the number of
trials K ∈ N and generate independent draws (xkl; k = 1, . . . , K, l = 1, . . . , α) of X .
This can be done by one of the following techniques:
• Each xkl is drawn uniformly from the recent T realizations x1, . . . , xT of X . For
example, if ∆ is one day (which is a typical choice), these are T recent daily
increments of the value of the portfolio under consideration.
• Each xkl is drawn from recent T realizations x1, . . . , xT of X , according to a
probability measure ν on {1, . . . , T} . A natural example is: T = ∞ , so that xt
is the increment of the portfolio’s value over the interval [−t∆,−(t − 1)∆], where
0 is the current time instant; ν is the geometric distribution with a parameter λ .
This method enables one to put more mass on recent realizations of X . It is at
the basis of the weighted historical simulation (see [17; Sect. 5.3]). Typically, λ is
chosen between 0.95 and 0.99.
• Each xkl might be generated using the bootstrap method, i.e. we split the time axis
into small intervals of length n−1∆ and create each xkl as a sum of the increments
of the portfolio’s value over n randomly chosen small intervals. The bootstrap
method might be combined with the weighting described above, i.e. we take recent
small intervals with a higher probability than old ones.
Having generated xkl , one should calculate the array
lk = argmin
l=1,...,α
xkl, k = 1, . . . , K.
According to (2.20), an empirical estimate of ρα(X) is provided by
ρe(X˜) = − 1
K
K∑
k=1
xklk .
In order to estimate Beta V@R with α, β ∈ N, one should generate xkl similarly.
Let lk1, . . . , lkβ be the numbers l ∈ {1, . . . , α} such that the corresponding xkl stand at
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the first β places (in the increasing order) among xk1, . . . , xkα . According to (2.18), an
empirical estimate of ρα,β(X) is provided by
ρe(X) = − 1
Kβ
K∑
k=1
β∑
i=1
xklki .
In order to estimate Weighted V@R, one should fix a data set x1, . . . , xT and a mea-
sure ν on {1, . . . , T} . This can be done by one of the following techniques:
• The values x1, . . . , xT are recent T realizations of X .
• The values x1, . . . , xT are obtained through the bootstrap technique, i.e. each xt
is a sum of the increments of the portfolio’s value over randomly chosen small
intervals; ν is uniform.
Let x(1), . . . , x(T ) be the values x1, . . . , xT in the increasing order. Define n(t) through
the equality x(t) = xn(t) . According to (2.8), an empirical estimate of ρµ(X) is provided
by
ρe(X) = −
T∑
t=1
xn(t)
∫ zt
zt−1
ψµ(x)dx,
where zt =
∑T
i=1 ν{n(i)} and ψµ is given by (2.7).
An advantage of Weighted V@R over Alpha V@R and Beta V@R is that it is a wider
class. However, Beta V@R is already rather a flexible family. A big advantage of Alpha
V@R and Beta V@R is that their empirical estimation procedure does not require the data
ordering (the number of operations required to order the data set x1, . . . , xT is T lnT ;
this is a particularly unpleasant number for T = ∞ , which is one of typical possible
choices in estimating Alpha V@R and Beta V@R). Note that, for estimating V@R from
a data set of size T , one needs to order the time series, and the number of operations
required grows quadratically in T . Thus, Alpha V@R and Beta V@R are not only much
wiser than V@R; they are also estimated faster!
3 Factor Risk
1. L1 -spaces. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space and u be a coherent utility with the
determining set D .
For the theorems below, we need to define the L1 -spaces associated with a coherent
risk measure (they were introduced in [14]). The weak and strong L1 -spaces are
L1w(D) = {X ∈ L0 : u(X) > −∞, u(−X) > −∞},
L1s(D) =
{
X ∈ L0 : lim
n→∞
sup
Q∈D
EQ|X|I(|X| > n) = 0
}
.
Clearly, L1s(D) ⊆ L1w(D). In general, this inclusion might be strict. Indeed,
let X0 be a positive unbounded random variable with P(X0 = 0) > 0 and let
D = {Q ∈ P : EQX0 = 1} . Then X0 ∈ L1w(D), but X0 /∈ L1s(D). However, as shown by
the examples below, in most natural situations these two spaces coincide and have a very
simple form.
Example 3.1. (i) If D = {Q} is a singleton, then L1w(D) = L1s(D) = L1(Q), which
motivates the notation.
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(ii) For Weighted V@R, we have L1w(Dµ) = L1s(Dµ) (see [14; Subsect. 2.2]), so we
can denote this space simply by L1(Dµ). It is clear from (2.12) that P ∈ Dµ , so that
L1 ⊆ L1(Dµ) (throughout the paper, L1 stands for L1(P)). In general, this inclusion
can be strict. However, if
∫
(0,1]
λ−1µ(dλ) < ∞ (for example, the weighting measures of
Tail V@R, Beta V@R with β > 0, and Alpha V@R satisfy this condition), then it is
seen from (2.12) that all the densities from Dµ are bounded by
∫
(0,1]
λ−1µ(dλ), so that
L1(Dµ) = L1 .
(iii) If ρ is the moment-based risk measure of Example 2.8 with α > 0, then clearly
L1w(D) ⊆ Lp and Lp ⊆ L1s(D), so that L1w(D) = L1s(D) = Lp . ✷
2. Factor risk. Let Y be a random variable (resp., random vector) meaning the
increment over the unit time period of some market factor (resp., several market factors).
Definition 3.2. The factor utility is
uf(X ; Y ) = inf
Q∈E(D|Y )
EQX,
where E(D|Y ) := {E(Z |Y ) : Z ∈ D} .
The factor risk is ρf (X ; Y ) := −uf(X ; Y ).
Remarks. (i) As D is convex, E(D|Y ) is also convex.
(ii) If D is convex and L1 -closed, then E(D|Y ) is not necessarily L1 -closed. As an
example, consider Ω = [0, 1]2 endowed with the Lebesgue measure and let
D =
{ ∞∑
n=1
anZn : an ∈ R+,
∞∑
n=1
an = 1
}
,
where
Zn(x1, x2) =


1/n if x1 ≤ 1/2,
2n− 1 if x1 > 1/2 and x2 ≤ 1/n,
0 otherwise.
Let Y (x1, x2) = x1 . Then
E(Zn |Y ) L
1−−−→
n→∞
2I(x1 > 1/2) /∈ E(D|Y ).
(iii) If D is convex, L1 -closed, and uniformly integrable, then E(D|Y ) is also
convex, L1 -closed, and uniformly integrable. Indeed, let Zn ∈ D be such that
E(Zn |Y ) L
1−→ Z . By Komlos’ principle of subsequences (see [39]), we can select a se-
quence Z˜n ∈ conv(Zn, Zn+1, . . . ) such that Z˜n a.s.−−→ Z˜ . As D is convex and uniformly
integrable, the convergence holds in L1 and Z˜ ∈ D . Then E(Z˜ |Y ) = Z , so that E(D|Y )
is L1 -closed. Its uniform integrability is a well-known fact. ✷
Theorem 3.3. For X ∈ L1s(D) ∩ L1s(E(D|Y )) ∩ L1 , we have
uf(X ; Y ) = u(E(X |Y )).
This theorem follows from
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Lemma 3.4. For X ∈ L1s(D) ∩ L1s(E(D|Y )) ∩ L1 and Z ∈ D , we have
EXE(Z |Y ) = EE(X |Y )Z .
Proof. We can write X = ξn + ηn , where ξn = XI(|X| ≤ n), ηn = XI(|X| > n),
n ∈ N. By the definition of L1 -spaces, E|ηn|Z → 0 and E|ηn|E(Z |Y )→ 0. The equality
EξnE(Z |Y ) = EE(ξn |Y )E(Z |Y ) = EE(ξn |Y )Z
and the estimates
E|E(ηn |Y )|Z ≤ EE(|ηn||Y )Z = EE(|ηn||Y )E(Z |Y ) = E|ηn|E(Z |Y )
yield the desired statement. ✷
Recall that a probability space (Ω,F ,P) is called atomless if for any A ∈ F with
P(A) > 0, there exist A1, A2 ∈ F such that A1 ∩A2 6= ∅ and P(Ai) > 0.
Corollary 3.5. Suppose that (Ω,F ,P) is atomless and u is law invariant. Then, for
X ∈ L1s(D), we have
uf(X ; Y ) = u(E(X |Y )).
Proof. By Corollary A.2, L1s(E(D|Y )) ⊆ L1s(D). Furthermore, it is clear from (2.12)
that P ∈ Dµ for any µ , so that, by Theorem A.1, P ∈ D and L1 ⊆ L1s(D). Now, the
result follows from Theorem 3.3. ✷
Example 3.6. Let u be a law invariant coherent utility that is finite on Gaussian
random variables. Let (X, Y ) = (X, Y 1, . . . , Y M) have a jointly Gaussian distribution.
Denote X = X − EX , Y = Y − EY . We can represent X as
X = EX +
M∑
m=1
hmY
m
+ ξ,
where Eξ = 0 and ξ is independent of Y . Then
uf(X ; Y ) = EX − γ
(
E
( M∑
m=1
hmY
m
)2)1/2
= EX − γ∣∣pr
Lin(Y
1
,...,Y
M
)
(X)
∣∣,
where Lin(Y
1
, . . . , Y
M
) denotes the linear space spanned by Y
1
, . . . , Y
M
, pr denotes the
projection, and γ is provided by Example 2.11 (i).
Let us give an expression for uf(X ; Y ) in the matrix form. Denote am = cov(X, Y m)
and let C be the covariance matrix of Y . Let L be the image of RM under the map
x 7→ Cx. Note that a ∈ L. The inverse C−1 : L→ L is correctly defined. The vector h
is found from the condition
cov(Xm − 〈h, Y 〉, Y m) = am − (Ch)m = 0, m = 1, . . . ,M,
which shows that h = C−1a. We have∣∣pr
Lin(Y
1
,...,Y
M
)
(X)
∣∣2 = E〈h, Y 〉2 = 〈h, Ch〉 = 〈C−1a, a〉.
As a result,
uf(X ; Y ) = EX − γ〈C−1a, a〉1/2.
In particular, if Y is one-dimensional, then
uf(X ; Y ) = EX − γ | cov(X, Y )|
(var Y )1/2
. ✷
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From the financial point of view, ρf(X ; Y ) means the risk of X in view of the uncer-
tainty contained in Y . So, we could expect that passing from Y to a compound random
vector (Y, Y ′) would increase ρf . The theorem below states that this is indeed true for
law invariant risk measures.
Theorem 3.7. Suppose that (Ω,F ,P) is atomless and u is law invariant. Then, for
any random variable X and any random vectors Y, Y ′ , we have
uf(X ; Y, Y ′) ≤ uf(X ; Y ).
Proof. By Theorem A.1, D = ⋃µ∈MDµ with some set M of probability measures on
(0, 1]. It is seen from (2.12) and the Jensen inequality that
E(Dµ |Y ) = {Z ∈ L0 : Z is Y -measurable, Z ≥ 0, EZ = 1,
and E(Z − x)+ ≤ Φµ(x) ∀x ∈ R+},
and the similar representation is true for E(Dµ |Y, Y ′). Now, it is clear from the Jensen
inequality that E(Dµ |Y ) ⊆ E(Dµ |Y, Y ′), so that E(D|Y ) ⊆ E(D|Y, Y ′), and the result
follows. ✷
Remark. Coherent risk measures ρ with the property ρ(E(X | G)) ≤ ρ(X) for any X
and any sub-σ -field G of F are called dilatation monotonous (this property was intro-
duced by J. Leitner [43]). Thus, Theorems 3.3 and 3.7 show that on an atomless space
any law invariant risk measure is dilatation monotonous. ✷
The example below shows that the condition of law invariance is important in Theo-
rem 3.7.
Example 3.8. Let D consist of a unique measure Q. Take Y = 0 and let Y ′ be such
that σ(Y ′) = F . Then uf(X ; Y ) = EX , while uf(X ; Y, Y ′) = u(X) = EQX . Clearly, the
inequality EQX ≤ EX might be violated. ✷
3. Factor model. The question that immediately arises in connection with the factor
risks is: How close is uf(X ; Y ) to u(X)? Below we provide a sufficient condition for the
closeness between uf(X ; Y ) and u(X). This will be done within the framework of the
factor model, which is very popular in statistics.
Let u be a law invariant coherent utility that is finite on Gaussian random variables
and F = (F 1, . . . , FM) be a random vector whose components belong to L1w(D). We will
assume that u(〈b, F 〉) < 0 for any b ∈ RM \ {0} . Let
Xn = BnF + ξn, n ∈ N,
where Bn is n ×M -matrix and ξn = (ξ1n, . . . , ξnn), where ξ1n, . . . , ξnn , F are independent
and ξin is Gaussian with mean 0 and variance (σ
i
n)
2 . We will assume that there exists a
sequence (an) such that an →∞ and
a−1n
n∑
k=1
Bkmn −−−→
n→∞
bm, m = 1, . . . ,M,
a−2n
n∑
k=1
(σkn)
2 −−−→
n→∞
0
with b = (b1, . . . , bM) 6= 0.
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Theorem 3.9. We have
uf
(∑n
k=1X
k
n;F
)
u
(∑n
k=1X
k
n
) −−−→
n→∞
1.
Proof. We have
a−1n u
( n∑
k=1
Xkn
)
= u(〈bn, F 〉+ ηn),
where bmn = a
−1
n
∑n
k=1B
km
n , m = 1, . . . ,M , and ηn is Gaussian with mean 0 and variance
σ2n = a
−2
n
∑n
k=1(σ
k
n)
2 . Moreover, ηn is independent of F . Let η be a Gaussian random
variable with mean 0 and variance 1 that is independent of F . In view of the law invariance
of u ,
u(〈bn, F 〉+ ηn) = u(〈bn, F 〉+ σnη).
Consider the set G = cl{EQ(F, η) : Q ∈ D} , where “cl” denotes the closure and D is the
determining set of u . In view of the inclusions Fm ∈ L1w(D), η ∈ L1w(D), the set G is a
convex compact in RM+1 (in the terminology of [14], G is the generator of (F, η) and u).
Then
u(〈bn, F 〉+ σnη) = inf
Q∈D
EQ(〈bn, F 〉+ σnη) = inf
x∈G
〈(bn, σn), x〉
−−−→
n→∞
inf
x∈G
〈(b, 0), x〉 = inf
Q∈D
EQ〈b, F 〉 = u(〈b, F 〉).
In a similar way we prove that
a−1n u
f
( n∑
k=1
Xkn;F
)
= u(〈bn, F 〉) −−−→
n→∞
u(〈b, F 〉).
To complete the proof, it is sufficient to note that u(〈b, F 〉) < 0. ✷
4. Multifactor risk. The previous theorem shows that in order to assess
the risk ρ(X), one can take the main factors Y 1, . . . , Y M driving risk, and then
ρ(X) ≈ ρf (X ; Y 1, . . . , Y M). The question arises: What is the relationship between
ρf (X ; Y 1, . . . , Y M) and ρf (X ; Y 1) + · · ·+ ρf (X ; Y M)? First, we provide a positive state-
ment.
Proposition 3.10. Assume that Y 1, . . . , Y M are independent and X =
∑M
m=1X
m ,
where Xm is Y m -measurable, Xm ∈ L1s(D) ∩ L1s(E(D|Y )) ∩ L1 , and EXm = 0. Then
ρf (X ; Y 1, . . . , Y M) ≤
M∑
m=1
ρf(X ; Y m). (3.1)
Proof. We have
ρf(X ; Y 1, . . . , Y M) = ρ(E(X |Y 1, . . . , Y M)) = ρ(X),
ρf(X ; Y m) = ρ(E(X | Y m)) = ρ(Xm),
and the result follows from the subadditivity property of ρ. ✷
The conditions of the proposition are unrealistic because different factors are corre-
lated. This might lead to violation of (3.1) as shown by the example below.
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Example 3.11. Let (Y 1, Y 2) be a Gaussian random vector with mean 0 and covari-
ance matrix (
1 1− ε
1− ε 1
)
.
Take X = Y 1 − Y 2 . Let ρ be a law invariant coherent risk measure that is finite on
Gaussian random variables. Then
ρf(X ; Y 1, Y 2) = ρ(X) = γ(var(Y 1 − Y 2))1/2 = γ
√
2ε,
where γ is provided by Example 2.11 (i). On the other hand, by Example 3.6,
ρf (X ; Y n) = γ
| cov(X, Y n)|
(var Y n)1/2
= γε, n = 1, 2.
If ε is small enough, then the inequality γ
√
2ε ≤ 2γε is violated. ✷
Y 1
Y 2
X
Figure 6. In Example 3.11, ρf (X;Y 1;Y 2)/γ
is the length of X , while ρf (X;Y n)/γ is the
length of the projection of X on Y n .
The effect described in this example has the following financial background. Suppose
that we have several correlated factors Y 1, . . . , Y M and a portfolio consisting of M parts,
i.e. X =
∑
mX
m , where the risk of the m-th part is driven mainly by the m-th factor.
Then Xm is correlated with Y k for m 6= k simply because Y m and Y k are correlated.
Thus, when summing up ρf (X ; Y m) over m, we are calculating the factor loading of Y m
in Xm once through the m-th factor risk and then several times more through the other
correlated factor risks. This might lead to a significant increment as well as a significant
reduction of the estimated risk (which was described by Example 3.11). In this situation,
the right way to estimate ρ(X) is to take ρf(X1; Y 1)+ · · ·+ρf(XM ; Y M). Indeed, if each
Xm corresponds to a big portfolio, then above results tell us that ρ(Xm; Y m) ≈ ρ(Xm),
and then
ρ(X) ≤ ρ
( M∑
m=1
Xm
)
≈
M∑
m=1
ρf (Xm; Y m).
Another pleasant feature of this technique is that we estimate the m-th factor risk only for
a part of the portfolio rather than the whole portfolio, which accelerates the computation
speed.
However, it might happen that we cannot split a portfolio in several groups such
that the risk of each group is affected by one factor only (for example, the risk of credit
derivatives is affected by the whole yield curve). But then we might combine the one-
factor and the multifactor techniques as follows. Suppose that we can split the factors
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into several groups (thus we again have Y 1, . . . , Y M , but now these random variables are
multidimensional) and split the portfolio into M parts, i.e. X =
∑
mX
m , so that the
risk of the m-th part is driven mainly by the m-th group of factors. Then we can assess
the risk of the portfolio as ρf (X1; Y 1) + · · ·+ ρf (XM ; Y M).
5. Empirical estimation. In view of Theorem 3.3, the empirical estimation of
ρf (X ; Y ) reduces to finding the function f(y) = E(X |Y = y) and then applying the
procedures described at the end of Section 2 to xkl := f(ykl). However, for factor risks
we can use one more convenient method of the choice of data.
Suppose that Y is one-dimensional and let σ be the current volatility of Y . It might
be estimated through one of numerous well-known methods; in particular, σ might be the
implied volatility. It is a widely accepted idea that volatility serves as the speed of growth
of the inner time (known also as the business or operational time) for Y . In other words,
if the current volatility is σ , then Y is currently oscillating at the speed σ2 . Following
this idea, we can take as the data for Y the values y1, . . . , yT , where yt is the increment
of Y over the time interval [−tσ2∆,−(t − 1)σ2∆] and ∆ is the unit time period. Here
it is reasonable to take standardized time series for Y rather than the ordinary one: we
calculate empirically the integrated volatility and take its inverse as the time change to
obtain standardized time series from the ordinary one. This approach enables one
• to use large data sets;
• to capture volatility predictions immediately.
If ∆ is one day (which is a typical choice), then σ2∆ would be a non-integer number of
days, which is not very convenient. This can be overcome as follows. We choose a large
number n ∈ N and split the time axis into small intervals of length n−1∆. Then we
approximate σ2 by a rational number m/n and generate each yt as a sum of increments
of Y over m randomly chosen small intervals. In other words, this is a combination of
the time change procedure with the bootstrap technique.
Instead of the time change procedure described above, one can also use the classi-
cal scaling procedure, which is at the basis of the filtered historical simulation (see [17;
Sect. 5.6]). Namely, instead of altering the time step for yt , we keep the same time
step ∆, but multiply each yt by the current volatility σ . As above, it is reasonable to
take standardized time series for Y rather than the ordinary one: we divide each ob-
served increment of Y by its volatility estimated through one of standard techniques (for
example, GARCH).
Let us remark that both the time change and the scaling work only for one-dimensional
Y s because if Y is multidimensional, its different components have different volatilities.
This is a big advantage of one-factor risks.
4 Portfolio Optimization
1. Problem. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space and u1, . . . , uM be coherent utili-
ties with the determining sets D1, . . . ,DM . A particular example we have in mind is
um = uf( · ; Y m), where Y 1, . . . , Y M are the main factors driving the risk of a portfolio.
Let X1, . . . , Xd ∈ ⋂m L1w(Dm) be the P&Ls produced by traded assets over the unit time
period, so that the space of possible P&Ls attained by various investment strategies is
{〈h,X〉 : h ∈ Rd} , where X = (X1, . . . , Xd). We will assume that um(〈h,X〉) < 0 for
any h ∈ Rd \ {0} . This condition means that the risk of any trade is strictly positive
and is known as the No Good Deals condition (see [14]). Let E = (E1, . . . , Ed) be the
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vector of rewards for X1, . . . , Xd . One might think of E as the vector of expectations
(EX1, . . . ,EXd). However, this is not the only interpretation of E . In general, we mean
by E the vector of subjective assessments by some agent of the profitability of the assets
X1, . . . , Xd . In this case E need not be related to EX , and EX can be equal to zero.
We will consider the Markowitz-type optimization problem, risk being measured not
as variance, but rather as the vector of risks:

〈h,E〉 −→ max,
h ∈ Rd,
ρm(〈h,X〉) ≤ cm, m = 1, . . . ,M,
(4.1)
where c1, . . . , cM ∈ (0,∞) are fixed risk limits.
2. Geometric solution. The paper [15; Subsect. 2.2] contains a geometric solution
of this problem with M = 1. Here we will present a similar geometric solution for an
arbitrary M . Let us introduce the notation
Gm = cl{EQX : Q ∈ Dm}, m = 1, . . . ,M,
G = conv{Gm/cm : m = 1, . . . ,M}.
Note that Gm, G are convex compacts in Rd . According to the terminology of [14], Gm
is the generator of X and um . The role of this set is seen from the equality
um(〈h,X〉) = inf
x∈Gm
〈h, x〉, m = 1, . . . ,M. (4.2)
The right-hand side is the classical object of convex analysis termed the support function
of the set Gm . The notion of the generator was found to be very convenient for the
geometric solutions of various problems like capital allocation, portfolio optimization,
pricing, and equilibrium (see [14], [15]). As um(〈h,X〉) < 0 for any h ∈ Rd \ {0} , the
point 0 belongs to the interior of G. Let T be the intersection of the ray (E, 0) with the
border of G. Denote by N the set of inner normals to G at the point T (typically, N is
a ray).
Theorem 4.1. The set of solutions of problem (4.1) is {h ∈ N : 〈h, T 〉 = −1} and
the maximal 〈h,E〉 is |E|/|T |.
Remark. Note that N is a non-empty cone, so that {h ∈ N : 〈h, T 〉 = −1} 6= ∅ .
Furthermore, 0 < |E|/|T | <∞ . ✷
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Using (4.2), we can write
(4.1) ⇐⇒


〈h,E〉 −→ max,
h ∈ Rd,
inf
x∈Gm
〈h, x〉 ≥ −cm
⇐⇒


〈h,E〉 −→ max,
h ∈ Rd,
inf
x∈G
〈h, x〉 ≥ −1.
Denote {h ∈ N : 〈h, T 〉 = −1} by H∗ . For any h ∈ H∗ , we have
inf
x∈G
〈h, x〉 = 〈h, T 〉 = −1
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E
Figure 7. Solution of the optimization
problem. Here h∗ denotes the optimal h .
and
〈h,E〉 = −|E||T | 〈h, T 〉 =
|E|
|T | . (4.3)
If h /∈ H∗ and infx∈G〈h, x〉 ≥ −1, then infx∈G〈h, x〉 < 〈h, T 〉 , so that 〈h, T 〉 > −1,
and, due to (4.3), 〈h,E〉 < |E|/|T | . ✷
Remark. We can also provide a geometric solution of (4.1) under portfolio constraints
of the type h ∈ H , where H is a convex cone, and the ambiguity of the reward vector E .
This is done by transforming (4.1) into the problem with one constraint as described
above and then applying the result of [15; Subsect. 2.2], where the cone constraints and
the ambiguity were taken into account. ✷
Example 4.2. Let X1, . . . , Xd ∈ L1(Dµ) and Y be an M -dimensional random vec-
tor. Then the generator of ufµ( · ; Y ) and X has the form
cl{EQX : Q ∈ E(Dµ |Y )} = cl
{∫
RM
f(y)Z(y)Q(dy) : Z ≥ 0,
∫
RM
Z(y)Q(dy) = 1,
and
∫
RM
(Z(y)− x)+Q(dy) ≤ Φµ(x) ∀x ∈ R+
}
,
where f(y) = E(X |Y = y), Q = Law Y , and Φµ is given by (2.13). In order to prove
this equality, denote its left-hand side by G and its right-hand side by G′ . Due to (2.12),
inf
x∈G′
〈h, x〉 = u′µ(〈h, f〉), h ∈ Rd,
where u′µ is minus the Weighted V@R with the weighting measure µ on the probability
space (RM ,B(RM),Q). As uµ and u′µ depend only on the distribution of a random
variable (this is seen from (2.6), (2.10)) and LawQ〈h, f〉 = Law〈h, f(Y )〉 , we get
u′µ(〈h, f〉) = uµ(〈h, f(Y )〉) = uµ(E(〈h,X〉|Y )) = uf(X ; Y )
= inf
Q∈E(Dµ |Y )
EQ〈h,X〉 = inf
x∈G
〈h, x〉, h ∈ Rd.
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Thus, the support functions of G and G′ coincide. Furthermore, both G and G′ are
convex and closed. As a result, G = G′ . ✷
3. Practical aspects. The geometric solution presented above provides a nice
theoretical insight into the form of the optimal portfolio. It can be used if we have a
model for the joint distribution of X1, . . . , Xd . However, if we do not have such a model,
but rather want to approach (4.1) empirically, then, instead of the geometric solution, the
following straightforward procedure can be employed. First of all,
(4.1) ⇐⇒


〈h,E〉 −→ max,
h ∈ Rd,
min
m=1,...,M
um(〈h,X〉)
cm
≥ −1.
Due to the scaling property, the solution to this problem coincides up to multiplication
by a positive (easily computable) constant with the solution of the problem

min
m=1,...,M
um(〈h,X〉)
cm
−→ max,
h ∈ Rd,
〈h,E〉 = 1.
This is a problem of maximizing a convex functional over an affine space. A typical
example we have in mind is um = uf( · ; Y m), where u is one of uµ , uα,β , or uα . In this
case the values um(〈h,X〉) can easily be estimated empirically through the procedures
described at the end of Section 2.
If E is the vector of expected profits (EX1, . . . ,EXd), then its empirical estimation
is known to be an extremely unpleasant problem (see the discussion in [9] and the 20’s
example in [34]), unlike the estimation of the volatility-type quantities um . The reason
is that this vector is very close to zero, and therefore, its direction (which is in fact the
input that we need) depends on the data in a very unstable way. One of possible ways
to overcome this problem is to use theoretical estimates of E rather than empirical ones.
For example, Sharpe’s SML relation ([58]) implies that
Ei = βi × const, i = 1, . . . , d
(recall that X i is the discounted P&L produced by the i-th asset). Thus, the direction
of E (and this is what we need) coincides with that of (β1, . . . , βd).
5 Risk Contribution
1. Extreme measures. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space and u be a coherent utility
with the determining set D . Let W be a random variable meaning the P&L produced
by some portfolio over the unit time period.
The following definition was introduced in [14].
Definition 5.1. A measure Q ∈ D is an extreme measure for W if
EQW = u(W ) ∈ (−∞,∞).
The set of extreme measures will be denoted by XD(W ).
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Proposition 5.2. If the determining set D is L1 -closed and uniformly integrable,
while W ∈ L1s(D), then XD(W ) 6= ∅.
Proof. It is clear that u(X) ∈ (−∞,∞). Find a sequence Zn ∈ D such that
EZnX → u(X). By the Dunford–Pettis criterion, D is compact with respect to the weak
topology σ(L1, L∞). Therefore, the sequence (Zn) has a weak limit point Z∞ ∈ D .
Clearly, the map D ∋ Z 7→ EZX is weakly continuous. Hence, EZ∞X = u(X), which
means that Z∞ ∈ XD(X). ✷
Remark. It is seen from (2.12) that the determining set of Weighted V@R is L1 -closed
and uniformly integrable (note that Φµ(x)→ 0 as x→∞). ✷
Example 5.3. (i) If λ ∈ (0, 1] and W ∈ L1 , then
XDλ(W ) =
{
Z : Z ≥ 0, EZ = 1, Z = λ−1 a.s. on {W < qλ(W )},
and Z = 0 a.s. on {W > qλ(W )}
}
,
(5.1)
where Dλ is given by (2.3). Indeed, if Z belongs to the right-hand side of (5.1), then, for
any Z ′ ∈ Dλ , we have
EWZ ′ − EWZ = E(W − qλ(W ))Z ′ − E(W − qλ(W ))Z
= E[(W − qλ(W ))(Z ′ − λ−1)I(W − qλ(W ) < 0)
+ (W − qλ(W ))Z ′I(W − qλ(W ) > 0)].
It is seen that this quantity is positive and equals zero if and only if Z ′ belongs to the
right-hand side of (5.1).
(ii) Let Ω = {1, . . . , T} and W (t) = wt . Assume that w1 < · · · < wT . Set
zt =
∑t
i=1 P{i} . It is seen from (i) that, for any λ ∈ (0, 1], XDλ(W ) consists of the
unique measure Qλ(W ) having the form
Qλ(W ){i} =


λ−1P{i}, i ≤ n− 1,
1− λ−1zn−1, i = n,
0, i > n,
where n is such that zn−1 < λ ≤ zn . This can be rewritten as
Qλ(W ){i} = λ−1
∫ λ
0
I(zi−1 < x ≤ zi)dx, i = 1, . . . , T.
It follows from [16; Prop. 6.2] that XDµ(W ) consists of the unique measure
Qµ(W ) =
∫
(0,1]
Qλ(W )µ(dλ). We have
Qµ(W ){i} =
∫
(0,1]
∫ λ
0
λ−1I(zi−1 < x ≤ zi)dxµ(dλ)
=
∫ 1
0
∫
[x,1]
λ−1I(zi−1 < x ≤ zi)µ(dλ)dx
=
∫ 1
0
I(zi−1 < x ≤ zn)ψµ(x)dx
=
∫ zn
zn−1
ψµ(x)dx, i = 1, . . . , T,
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where ψµ is given by (2.7).
(iii) If W ∈ L1(Dµ) has a continuous distribution, then XDµ(W ) consists of the unique
measure Qµ(W ) = ψµ(F (W ))P, where F is the distribution function of W (for the proof,
see [16; Sect. 6]). The measure Qµ has already appeared in (2.11).
(iv) Suppose that α, β ∈ N and W ∈ L1(Dµ) has a continuous distribution. For
Beta V@R, the measure Qµ(W ) of the previous example gets a more concrete form
Qα,β(W ) = ψα,β(F (W ))P = ϕ(W )P, where ψα,β is provided by (2.19).
Let us clarify the meaning of ϕ . Let W1, . . . ,Wα be independent copies of W ,
W(1), . . . ,W(α) be the corresponding order statistics, and ξ be an independent uniformly
distributed on {1, . . . , β} random variable. According to the reasoning of Example 2.9,
the distribution function of W(ξ) is Ψα,β ◦ F , where
Ψα,β(x) =
∫ x
0
ψα,β(y)dy, x ∈ [0, 1].
Consequently,
dLawW(ξ)
dLawW
(x) =
dΨα,β(F (x))
dF (x)
= ψα,β(F (x)) = ϕ(x).
(v) For Alpha V@R with α ∈ N, we have ψα(x) = α(1− x)α−1 and
ϕ(x) = α(1− F (x))α−1 = dLawmin{W1, . . . ,Wα}
dLawW
. ✷
If an agent is using the classical expected utility EU(X) to assess the quality of
his/her position, then there exists his/her “personal” measure with which he/she assesses
the quality of any possible trade. This measure is given by Q = cU ′(W1)P, where W1 is
the agent’s wealth at the terminal date and c is the normalizing constant. The role of
this measure is seen from the equality
lim
ε↓0
ε−1(EU(W1 + εX)− EU(W1)) = EXU ′(W1) = c−1EQX.
If X is the P&L produced by some trade and X is small as compared to W , then X
is profitable for the agent if and only if EQX > 0. The extreme measure is the coherent
substitute for this agent-specific measure as seen from Theorem 5.5 stated below.
2. Risk contribution. The following definition was introduced in [14].
Definition 5.4. The utility contribution is defined as
uc(X ;W ) = inf
Q∈XD(W )
EQX, X ∈ L0.
The risk contribution is defined as ρc(X ;W ) = −uc(X ;W ).
If XD(W ) is non-empty, then uc( · ;W ) is a coherent utility.
Theorem 5.5. If D is L1 -closed and uniformly integrable and X,W ∈ L1s(D), then
uc(X ;W ) = lim
ε↓0
ε−1(u(W + εX)− u(W )).
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For the proof, see [14; Subsect. 2.5].
For theoretical purposes, it is sometimes convenient to use a geometric represen-
tation of uc(X ;W ). Suppose that D is L1 -closed and uniformly integrable, while
X,W ∈ L1s(D). Denote by G the generator cl{EQ(X,W ) : Q ∈ D} and set e1 = (1, 0),
e2 = (0, 1). Then
XD(W ) =
{
Q ∈ D : EQW = min
z∈G
〈e2, z〉
}
,
and therefore,
uc(X ;W ) = min
{
x :
(
x,min
z∈G
〈e2, z〉
) ∈ G}. (5.2)
✲
✻
x
y
u(W )
u(X) uc(X ;W )
G
Figure 8. Geometric representation of uc(X;W )
Example 5.6. (i) If W is a constant, then XD(W ) = D , so that uc(X ;W ) = u(X).
(ii) If X = λW with λ ∈ R+ , then uc(X ;W ) = λu(W ) provided that XD(W ) 6= ∅ .
(iii) Let u be law invariant and (X,W ) be jointly Gaussian. We assume that
X,W ∈ L1s(D) and that the covariance matrix C of (X,W ) is non-degenerate. Set
X = X − EX , W = W − EW . As (X,W ) can be represented as C1/2V , where V is a
standard two-dimensional Gaussian random vector, the generator G of (X,W ) has the
form G = C1/2GV , where GV is the generator of V . Clearly, GV is the ball of radius γ ,
where γ is provided by Example 2.11 (i). Thus,
G = {x ∈ R2 : 〈C−1/2x, C−1/2x〉 ≤ γ2} = {x ∈ R2 : 〈x, C−1x〉 ≤ γ2}.
Set e1 = (1, 0), e2 = (0, 1). By (5.2), u
c(X,W ) = 〈e1, z∗〉 , where z∗ = argminz∈G〈e2, z〉 .
The point z∗ is found from the condition
0 =
d
dε
∣∣∣
ε=0
〈z∗ + εe1, C−1(z∗ + εe1)〉 = 2〈e1, C−1z∗〉,
which shows that C−1z∗ = αe2 with some α ≤ 0, i.e. z∗ = αCe2 . The constant α is
found from the condition 〈z∗, C−1z∗〉 = γ2 , which shows that α = −γ〈e2, Ce2〉−1/2 . As a
result,
uc(X ;W ) = EX + uc(X,W ) = EX − γ 〈e1, Ce2〉〈e2, Ce2〉1/2 = EX − γ
cov(X,W )
(varW )1/2
.
Note that u(X) = EX − γ(varX)1/2 . In particular, if EX = EW = 0, then
uc(X ;W )
u(X)
= corr(X,W ) =
V@Rc(X ;W )
V@R(X)
, (5.3)
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where V@Rc denotes the V@R contribution (for the definition, see [46; Sect. 7]).
(iv) Let Ω = {1, . . . , T} , X(t) = xt , W (t) = wt . Assume that all the values wt are
different. Let w(1), . . . , w(T ) be the values w1, . . . , wT in the increasing order. Define n(t)
through the equality w(t) = wn(t) . According to Example 5.3 (ii),
ucµ(X ;W ) = EQµ(W )X =
T∑
t=1
xn(t)
∫ zt
zt−1
ψµ(x)dx,
where zt =
∑t
i=1 P{n(i)} (cf. (2.8)).
(v) If W ∈ L1(Dµ) has a continuous distribution, then, according to Example 5.3 (iii),
ucµ(X ;W ) = EQµ(W )X = EXψµ(F (W ))
(cf. (2.11)). Note that this value is linear in X .
(vi) Suppose that α, β ∈ N, X,W ∈ L1 , and W has a continuous distribution.
Let (X1,W1), . . . , (Xα,Wα) be independent copies of (X,W ) and ξ be an independent
uniformly distributed on {1, . . . , β} random variable. Let W(1), . . . ,W(α) be the corre-
sponding order statistics. Define random variables n(i) through the equality W(i) = Wn(i)
(as W has a continuous distribution, all the values W1, . . . ,Wα are a.s. different, so that
n(i) is a.s. determined uniquely). We have (cf. (2.18))
EXn(ξ) = E
[ 1
β
β∑
i=1
Xn(i)
]
=
1
β
β∑
i=1
α∑
j=1
EXjI(n(i) = j)
=
1
β
β∑
i=1
α∑
j=1
EXjI{i− 1 members of W1, . . . ,Wα are smaller than Wj
and α− i members of W1, . . . ,Wα are greater than Wj}
=
1
β
β∑
i=1
α∑
j=1
E[XjF (Wj)
i−1(1− F (Wj))α−i]
=
α
β
β∑
i=1
C i−1α−1E[XF (W )
i−1(1− F (W ))α−i]
= EXψα,β(F (W ))
= ucα,β(X ;W ).
(vii) Suppose that α ∈ N, X,W ∈ L1 , and W has a continuous distribution. It
follows from (vi) that
ucα(X ;W ) = EXargmin
i=1,...,α
Wi,
where (X1,W1), . . . , (Xα,Wα) are independent copies of (X,W ). ✷
3. Capital allocation. The notion of risk contribution is closely connected with
the capital allocation problem. Suppose that a firm consists of several desks, i.e.
W =
∑N
n=1W
n , where W n is the P&L produced by the n-th desk. The following
definition was introduced in [20].
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Definition 5.7. A collection x1, . . . , xN is a capital allocation between W 1, . . . ,WN if
N∑
n=1
xn = ρ
( N∑
n=1
W n
)
, (5.4)
N∑
n=1
hnxn ≤ ρ
( N∑
n=1
hnXn
)
∀h1, . . . , hN ∈ R+. (5.5)
From the financial point of view, xi means the contribution of the i-th component to
the total risk of the firm, or, equivalently, the capital that should be allocated to this com-
ponent. In order to illustrate the meaning of (5.5), consider the example hn = I(n ∈ J),
where J is a subset of {1, . . . , N} . Then (5.5) means that the capital allocated to a part
of the firm does not exceed the risk carried by that part.
The following theorem was established in [14; Subsect. 2.4].
Theorem 5.8. Suppose that D is L1 -closed and uniformly integrable, while
W 1, . . . ,WN ∈ L1s(D). Then the set of solutions of the capital allocation problem has
the form {−EQ(W 1, . . . ,WN) : Q ∈ XD(W )}.
If XD(W ) consists of a unique measure Q, then the solution of the capital allocation
problem is unique and has the form (ρc(W 1;W ), . . . , ρc(WN ;W )). In particular, in this
case
ρ(W ) = −EQW = −
N∑
n=1
EQW
n =
N∑
n=1
ρc(W n;W ). (5.6)
4. Tail correlation. It follows from the inclusion XD(W ) ⊆ D that
uc(X ;W ) ≥ u(X). Typically, for a random variable X meaning the P&L of some trans-
action, we have u(X) < 0 (i.e. its risk is strictly positive), so that
κ(X ;W ) :=
uc(X ;W )
u(X)
≤ 1.
The coefficient κ is a good measure for the tail correlation between X and W (see (5.3)).
Let us recall that the standard tail correlation coefficient between X and W (see [47;
Sect. 5.2.3]) is defined as limλ↓0 cλ(X ;W ), where
cλ(X ;W ) =
P(X ≤ qλ(X), W ≤ qλ(W ))
P(X ≤ qλ(X)) =
EI(X ≤ qλ(X))I(W ≤ qλ(W ))
EI(X ≤ qλ(X))I(X ≤ qλ(X)) .
At the same time, κ(X ;W ) corresponding to u = uλ has the form
κλ(X ;W ) =
EXI(W ≤ qλ(W ))
EXI(X ≤ qλ(X)) .
This is the same as the expression for cλ(X ;W ) with I(X ≤ qλ(X)) being replaced by X .
However, an essential difference between κ and the standard tail correlation coefficient
is that κ is not symmetric in X,W .
Let us also remark that, for the Weighted V@R, κ(X ;W ) remains unchanged under
monotonic transformations of W , i.e. κ(X ;W ) = κ(X, f(W )), where f is a strictly
increasing function (this is seen from Example 5.6 (v)).
Let us study some basic properties of κ . Two propositions below correspond to two
extremes: no correlation and complete correlation.
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Proposition 5.9. Let X,W ∈ L1 and suppose that W has a continuous distribution.
Then ucλ(X ;W ) = 0 for any λ ∈ (0, 1] if and only if E(X |W ) = 0.
Proof. Set Zλ = λ
−1I(W ≤ qλ(W )). According to Example 5.6 (v),
ucλ(X ;W ) = λ
−1EXI(W ≤ qλ(W )) = λ−1
∫
(−∞,qλ(W )]
g(w)Q(dw), λ ∈ (0, 1],
where g(w) = E(X |W = w) and Q = LawW . Now, the result is obvious. ✷
Recall that random variables X and W are called comonotone if
(X(ω2)−X(ω1))(W (ω2)−W (ω1)) ≥ 0 for P× P-a.e. ω1, ω2 .
Proposition 5.10. Suppose that the support of µ is [0, 1]. Let X,W ∈ L1(Dµ).
Then ucµ(X ;W ) = uµ(X) if and only if X and W are comonotone.
Proof. Let us prove the “only if” part. The map Dµ ∋ Z 7→ EWZ is continuous with
respect to the weak topology σ(L1, L∞). Hence, the set XDµ(W ) is weakly closed. An
application of the Hahn–Banach theorem shows that XDµ(W ) is L1 -closed. By Propo-
sition 5.2, there exists Z ∈ XDµ(W ) such that EXZ = uc(X ;W ). According to [16;
Th. 4.4], there exists a jointly measurable function (Z(λ, ω);λ ∈ (0, 1], ω ∈ Ω) such that
Z =
∫
(0,1]
Zλµ(dλ) with Zλ ∈ Dλ for any λ . Then∫
(0,1]
EWZλµ(dλ) = EWZ = uµ(W ) =
∫
(0,1]
uλ(W )µ(dλ),
and it follows that Zλ ∈ XDλ(W ) for µ-a.e. λ . Furthermore,∫
(0,1]
EXZλµ(dλ) = EXZ = u
c
µ(X ;W ) = uµ(X) =
∫
(0,1]
uλ(X)µ(dλ),
and it follows that Zλ ∈ XDλ(X) for µ-a.e. λ . Thus, XDλ(W )∩XDλ(X) 6= ∅ for µ-a.e. λ .
Using (5.1), we get
P(X > qλ(X),W < qλ(W )) = P(X < qλ(X),W > qλ(W )) = 0 (5.7)
for µ-a.e. λ . As the functions qλ(X) and qλ(W ) are right-continuous in λ and the
support of µ is [0, 1], we deduce that (5.7) is satisfied for every λ ∈ (0, 1]. From this it
is easy to deduce that P((X,W ) ∈ f((0, 1])) = 1, where f(λ) = (qλ(X), qλ(W )). Thus,
X and W are comonotone.
Let us prove the “if” part. By [29; Lem. 4.83], there exists a random variable ξ and
increasing functions f, g such that X = f(ξ), W = g(ξ). Set
Zλ = λ
−1I(ξ < qλ(ξ)) + cI(ξ = qλ(ξ)),
where c is the constant such that EZλ = 1. According to [16; Th. 4.4],
Z :=
∫
(0,1]
Zλµ(dλ) ∈ Dµ . It is clear that Zλ ∈ XDλ(X) ∩ XDλ(W ). Hence,
EWZ =
∫
(0,1]
EWZλµ(dλ) =
∫
(0,1]
uλ(W )µ(dλ) = uµ(W ),
EXZ =
∫
(0,1]
EXZλµ(dλ) =
∫
(0,1]
uλ(X)µ(dλ) = uµ(X).
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As a result, Z ∈ XDµ(W ) and uc(X ;W ) ≤ uµ(X). Since the reverse inequality is obvious,
we get ucµ(X ;W ) = uµ(X). ✷
5. Empirical estimation. In order to estimate empirically Alpha V@R contribution
of X to W with α ∈ N, one should first choose the number of trials K ∈ N and generate
independent draws (xkl, wkl; k = 1, . . . , K, l = 1, . . . , α) of (X,W ) using one of procedures
described at the end of Section 2. Having generated xkl, wkl , one should calculate the
array
lk = argmin
l=1,...,α
wkl, k = 1, . . . , K.
According to Example 5.6 (vii), an empirical estimate of ρcα(X ;W ) is provided by
ρce(X ;W ) = −
1
K
K∑
k=1
xklk .
In order to estimate Beta V@R contribution with α, β ∈ N, one should generate
xkl, wkl similarly. Let lk1, . . . , lkβ be the numbers l ∈ {1, . . . , α} such that the corre-
sponding wkl stand at the first β places (in the increasing order) among wk1, . . . , wkα .
According to Example 5.6 (vi), an empirical estimate of ρcα,β(X ;W ) is provided by
ρce(X ;W ) = −
1
Kβ
K∑
k=1
β∑
i=1
xklki.
In order to estimate Weighted V@R contribution, one should fix a data set
(x1, w1), . . . , (xT , wT ) and a measure ν on {1, . . . , T} using one of the procedures de-
scribed at the end of Section 2. Let w(1), . . . , w(T ) be the values w1, . . . , wT in the in-
creasing order (we assume that all the wt are different). Define n(t) through the equality
w(t) = wn(t) . According to Example 5.6 (iv), an empirical estimate of ρ
c
µ(X ;W ) is pro-
vided by
ρce(X ;W ) = −
T∑
t=1
xn(t)
∫ zt
zt−1
ψµ(x)dx,
where zt =
∑T
i=1 ν{n(i)} and ψµ is given by (2.7).
6 Factor Risk Contribution
1. Factor risk contribution. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space and u be a coherent
utility with the determining set D . Let Y be a random variable (resp., random vector)
meaning the increment of some market factor (resp., factors) over the unit time period
and W be a random variable meaning the P&L produced by some portfolio over the unit
time period.
Definition 6.1. The factor utility contribution is
ufc(X ; Y ;W ) = inf
Q∈XE(D|Y )(W )
EQX, X ∈ L0.
The factor risk contribution is ρfc(X ; Y ;W ) = −ufc(X ; Y ;W ).
The function ufc( · ; Y ;W ) is a coherent utility provided that XE(D|Y )(W ) 6= ∅ .
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Proposition 6.2. If D is L1 -closed and uniformly integrable, while
W ∈ L1s(E(D|Y )), then XE(D|Y )(W ) 6= ∅.
Proof. By Remark (iii) following Definition 3.2, E(D|Y ) is L1 -closed and uniformly
integrable. Now, the result follows from Proposition 5.2. ✷
Theorem 6.3. If X,W ∈ L1s(D) ∩ L1s(E(D|Y )) ∩ L1 , then
ufc(X ; Y ;W ) = uc(E(X |Y );E(W |Y )).
Proof. By Lemma 3.4,
EWE(Z |Y ) = EE(W |Y )Z, Z ∈ D.
Thus,
E(Z |Y ) ∈ XE(D|Y )(W ) ⇐⇒ Z ∈ XD(E(W |Y )),
which means that
XE(D|Y )(W ) = E
(XD(E(W |Y ))|Y ).
One more application of Lemma 3.4 yields
EXE(Z |Y ) = EE(X |Y )Z, Z ∈ D.
As a result,
ufc(X ; Y ;W ) = inf
Z∈XD(E(W |Y ))
EXE(Z |Y )
= inf
Z∈XD(E(W |Y ))
EE(X |Y )Z
= uc(E(X |Y );E(W |Y )). ✷
Corollary 6.4. If D is L1 -closed and uniformly integrable, while
X,W ∈ L1s(D) ∩ L1s(E(D|Y )) ∩ L1 , then
ufc(X ; Y ;W ) = lim
ε↓0
ε−1(uf(W + εX ; Y )− uf(W ; Y )).
Proof. Applying successively Theorems 6.3, 5.5, and 3.3, we get
ufc(X ; Y ;W ) = uc(E(X |Y );E(W |Y ))
= lim
ε↓0
ε−1(u(E(W |Y ) + εE(X |Y ))− u(E(W |Y )))
= lim
ε↓0
ε−1(uf(W + εX ; Y )− uf(W ; Y ))
(in order to apply Theorem 5.5 in the second equality, we need to check that
E(X |Y ) ∈ L1s(D) and E(W |Y ) ∈ L1s(D); this is done by the same argument as in the
proof of Lemma 3.4). ✷
Remark. If (Ω,F ,P) is atomless and u is law invariant, then, by Corollary A.2, the
integrability condition on X,W in the above statements can be replaced by a weaker one:
X,W ∈ L1s(D). ✷
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Example 6.5. If W is a constant, then XE(D|Y )(W ) = E(D|Y ), so that
ufc(X ; Y ;W ) = uf(X ; Y ).
(ii) If X = λW with λ ∈ R+ , then ufc(X ; Y ;W ) = λuf(W ; Y ) provided that
XE(D|Y )(W ) 6= ∅ .
(iii) Let u be law invariant and (X, Y,W ) = (X, Y 1, . . . , Y M ,W ) be a non-degenerate
Gaussian random vector such that each of its components belongs to L1s(D). Let C denote
the covariance matrix of Y and set am = cov(X, Y m), bm = cov(W,Y m), X = X − EX ,
Y = Y − EY , W = W − EW . We have (cf. Example 3.6) E(X |Y ) = 〈C−1a, Y 〉 ,
E(W |Y ) = 〈C−1b, Y 〉 , so that, by Theorem 6.3 and Example 5.6 (iii),
ufc(X ; Y ;W ) = EX + ufc(X ; Y ;W )
= EX + uc(〈C−1a, Y 〉; 〈C−1b, Y 〉)
= EX − γ cov(〈C
−1a, Y 〉, 〈C−1b, Y 〉)
(var〈C−1b, Y 〉)1/2
= EX − γ 〈C
−1a, b〉
〈C−1b, b〉1/2 .
In particular, if Y is one-dimensional, then
ufc(X ; Y ;W ) = EX − γ cov(X, Y )
(var Y )1/2
sgn cov(W,Y ).
If moreover, cov(X, Y ) > 0 and cov(W,Y ) > 0, then, recalling Example 3.6 and Exam-
ple 5.6 (iii), we get
uf(X ; Y ) = uc(X ; Y ) = ufc(X ; Y ;W ) = EX − γ cov(X, Y )
(varY )1/2
.
✷
2. Empirical estimation. In view of Theorem 6.3, the empirical estimation of
ρfc(X ; Y ;W ) reduces to finding the functions f(y) = E(X |Y = y), g(y) = E(W |Y = y)
and then applying the procedures described at the end of Section 5 to xkl := f(ykl),
wkl = g(ykl).
If Y is one-dimensional, one can create the data for Y using the time change or the
scaling procedures described at the end of Section 3.
7 Optimal Risk Sharing
1. Problem. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space and u1, . . . , uM be coherent utilities
with the determining sets D1, . . . ,DM . We assume that each Dm is L1 -closed and uni-
formly integrable. Suppose there is a firm consisting of N desks, and the n-th desk can in-
vest into the assets that produce P&Ls (Xn1, . . . , Xnd
n
). We assume that Xnk ∈ L1s(Dm)
for any k, n,m. The set of P&Ls that the n-th desk can produce over a unit time period
is {〈hnXn〉 : hn ∈ Hn} , where Xn = (Xn1, . . . , Xndn) and Hn is a convex subset of Rdn
with a non-empty interior meaning the constraint on the portfolio of the n-th desk. We
assume that um(〈hn, Xn〉) < 0 for any hn ∈ Hn \ {0} , which means that any possible
trade has a strictly positive risk. Let En ∈ Rdn be the vector of rewards for the assets
available to the n-th desk. This is the vector of subjective assessments by the n-th desk
of the profitability of the assets Xn1, . . . , Xnd
n
.
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We will consider the following optimization problem for the whole firm:

∑
n〈hn, En〉 −→ max,
hn ∈ Hn, n = 1, . . . , N,
ρm
(∑
n〈hn, Xn〉
) ≤ cm, m = 1, . . . ,M,
(7.1)
where c1, . . . , cM ∈ (0,∞) are fixed risk limits. This problem is a generalization of (4.1),
which might be considered as the optimization problem for a separate desk. We will
not try to solve (7.1) for the following reason: if this problem admitted a solution that
can be implemented in practice, this would mean that the central management is able
to optimize the firm’s portfolio and there would be no need for the existence of separate
desks. Instead of trying to solve (7.1), we will study the following question: Is it possible
to decentralize (7.1), i.e. to create for the desks conditions such that the global optimum
is achieved when each desk acts optimally?
Hypothesis 1. There exist cnm such that if hn∗ satisfy the conditions
1. we have
ρm
( N∑
n=1
〈hn∗ , Xn〉
)
≤ cm, m = 1, . . . ,M,
and the equality is attained at least for one m;
2. for each n, the vector hn∗ solves the problem

〈hn, En〉 −→ max,
hn ∈ Hn,
ρm(〈hn, Xn〉) ≤ cnm, m = 1, . . . ,M,
(7.2)
then (h1∗, . . . , h
N
∗ ) solves (7.1).
This hypothesis is wrong as shown by the example below.
Example 7.1. Let M = 1, N = 2, u be a law invariant coherent utility that is finite
on Gaussian random variables, H1 = R, H2 = R2 , and (X1, X21, X22) have a jointly
Gaussian distribution with a non-degenerate covariance matrix C . It was shown in [15;
Subsect. 2.2] that the solution of (7.1) has the form
(h1∗, h
21
∗ , h
22
∗ ) = const× C−1(E1, E21, E22).
Furthermore, the solution of (7.2) with n = 2 has the form
(h˜21∗ , h˜
22
∗ ) = const× C˜−1(E21, E22),
where C˜ is the covariance matrix of (X21, X22) (the constant here depends on cnm ). It
is clear that there need not exist cnm such that (h˜21∗ , h˜
22
∗ ) = (h
21
∗ , h
22
∗ ). ✷
2. Limits on risk contribution. The reason why Hypothesis 1 is wrong is that in
general
ρ
( N∑
n=1
〈hn, Xn〉
)
<
N∑
n=1
ρ(〈hn, Xn〉).
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On the other hand, we typically have
ρ
( N∑
n=1
〈hn, Xn〉
)
=
N∑
n=1
ρc
(
〈hn, Xn〉;
N∑
n=1
〈hn, Xn〉
)
(see (5.6)). This gives rise to
Hypothesis 2. Let cnm ∈ R+ be such that
∑
n c
nm = cm for each m. If hn∗ satisfy
the conditions
1. we have
ρm
( N∑
n=1
〈hn∗ , Xn〉
)
≤ cm, m = 1, . . . ,M,
and the equality is attained at least for one m;
2. for each n, the vector hn∗ solves the problem

〈hn, En〉 −→ max,
hn ∈ Hn,
(ρm)c
(〈hn, Xn〉;∑n〈hn∗ , Xn〉) ≤ cnm, m = 1, . . . ,M,
then (h1∗, . . . , h
N
∗ ) solves (7.1).
This hypothesis is also wrong as shown by the example below.
Example 7.2. Let M = 1, N = 2, u be a law invariant coherent utility,
H1 = H2 = R, X1, X2 ∈ L1s(D) be jointly Gaussian with a non-degenerate covariance
matrix, and E1 = E2 = 1. Take arbitrary h1∗, h
2
∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that ρ(h1∗X1 + h2∗X2) = c
and
EXn < γ
cov(Xn, h1∗X
1 + h2∗X
2)
(var(h1∗X
1 + h2∗X
2))1/2
, n = 1, 2,
where γ is provided by Example 2.11 (i). Set
cn := ρc(hn∗X
n; h1∗X
1 + h2∗X
2) = −hn∗EXn + hn∗γ
cov(X1, h1∗X
1 + h2∗X
2)
(var(h1∗X
1 + h2∗X
2))1/2
, n = 1, 2
(we used Example 5.6 (iii)). Obviously, each hn∗ solves (7.2). On the other hand, (h
1
∗, h
2
∗)
need not be optimal for (7.1). ✷
3. Risk trading. The reason why Hypothesis 2 is wrong is that if one unit is more
profitable than another, but it obtains a lower risk limit, then the global optimum cannot
be achieved. In fact, if we replace fixed cnm in Hypothesis 2 by the assumption “there
exists cnm ...”, then (as follows from Theorem 7.3) the hypothesis becomes true. But this
leaves open the problem of finding cnm . Instead of trying to solve this problem, we will
take another path. Let us assume that the desks are allowed to trade their risk limits, i.e.
they establish themselves (through the supply–demand equilibrium) the price αm for the
m-th risk limit, so that if the n-th desk buys from the n′ -th desk a units of the m-th
risk limit, then the n-th desk pays the n′ -th desk the amount aαm , the n-th desk raises
its m-th risk limit by the amount a, and the n′ -th desk lowers its m-th risk limit by the
amount a.
Hypothesis 3. Let cnm ∈ R+ be such that
∑
n c
nm = cm for each m. If hn∗ ∈ Hn ,
anm∗ ∈ R, and αm∗ ∈ R+ satisfy the conditions
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1. we have
N∑
n=1
anm∗ = 0, m = 1, . . . ,M ;
2. we have
ρm
( N∑
n=1
〈hn∗ , Xn〉
)
≤ cm, m = 1, . . . ,M, (7.3)
and the equality is attained at least for one m;
3. αm∗ = 0 for all m such that inequality (7.3) is strict;
4. for each n, the vectors hn∗ and a
n
∗ = (a
nm
∗ ;m = 1, . . . ,M) solve the problem

〈hn, En〉 − 〈an, α∗〉 −→ max,
hn ∈ Hn, an ∈ Rm,
(ρm)c
(〈hn, Xn〉;∑n〈hn∗ , Xn〉) ≤ cnm + anm, m = 1, . . . ,M,
then (h1∗, . . . , h
N
∗ ) solves (7.1).
This hypothesis is true (under minor technical assumptions) as shown by the theorem
below.
Theorem 7.3. Let cnm ∈ R+ be such that
∑
n c
nm = cm for each m. Let hn∗ belong
to the interior of Hn and assume that, for each m, the set XDm
(∑
n〈hn∗ , Xn〉
)
consists
of a unique measure Qm . Then the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) h1∗, . . . , h
N
∗ solve (7.1);
(ii) there exist anm∗ ∈ R and αm∗ ∈ R+ that satisfy the conditions of Hypothesis 3;
(iii) there exist αm∗ ∈ R+ satisfying conditions 2, 3 of Hypothesis 3 and such that
En = −
M∑
m=1
αm∗ EQmX
n, n = 1, . . . , N.
Moreover, the sets of possible α∗ in (ii) and (iii) are the same.
Remark. The theorem shows that the system finds the optimum regardless of the
allocation cnm of risk limits. (The resulting rewards 〈hn∗ , En〉 − 〈an∗ , α∗〉 depend on cnm ,
but their sum does not depend on cnm .) It is also clear from (iii) that the equilibrium
prices αm∗ of risk limits do not depend on c
nm . ✷
Proof of Theorem 7.3. (i)⇒(iii) Set
J =
{
m : ρm
( N∑
n=1
〈hn∗ , Xn〉
)
= cm
}
,
K =
{
−
∑
m∈J
αmEQm(X
1, . . . , XN) : αm ∈ R+
}
,
so that K is a convex closed cone in Rd , where d = d1 + · · · + dN . Sup-
pose that E := (E1, . . . , EN) /∈ K . By the Hahn–Banach theorem, there exists
h = (h1, . . . , hN) ∈ Rd such that supx∈K〈h, x〉 ≤ 0 < 〈h,E〉 . Consider hn(ε) = hn∗ + εhn .
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There exists δ > 0 such that, for ε ∈ (0, δ), we have: hn(ε) ∈ Hn for any n and
ρm
(∑
n〈hn, Xn〉
)
< cm for any m /∈ J . Set
f(ε) =
N∑
n=1
〈hn(ε), En〉,
gm(ε) = ρm
( N∑
n=1
〈hn(ε), Xn〉
)
, m ∈ J.
Then
d
dε
∣∣∣
ε=0
f(ε) =
N∑
n=1
〈hn, En〉 = 〈h,E〉 > 0,
and, by Theorem 5.5,
d
dε
∣∣∣
ε=0
gm(ε) = −EQm
N∑
n=1
〈hn, Xn〉 ≤ sup
x∈K
〈h, x〉 ≤ 0, m ∈ J.
Due to our assumptions, gm(0) > 0. Then we can find ε ∈ (0, δ) and β ∈ (0, 1) such that
βhn(ε) ∈ Hn for each n, βf(ε) > f(0), and βgm(ε) ≤ gm(0) for any m ∈ J . This means
that
N∑
n=1
〈βhn(ε), En〉 >
N∑
n=1
〈hn∗ , En〉
and
ρm
( N∑
n=1
〈βhn(ε), Xn〉
)
≤ cm, m = 1, . . . ,M,
which is a contradiction. As a result, E ∈ K , which is the desired statement.
(iii)⇒(ii) It follows from the inequality
−
N∑
n=1
EQm〈hn∗ , Xn〉 = ρm
( N∑
n=1
〈hn∗ , Xn〉
)
≤ cm =
N∑
n=1
cnm, m = 1, . . . ,M
that we can choose anm∗ in such a way that
∑
n a
nm
∗ = 0 for any m and
anm∗ ≥ −EQm〈hn∗ , Xn〉 − cnm for any n,m. Then
(ρm)c
(
〈hn∗ , Xn〉;
N∑
n=1
〈hn∗ , Xn〉
)
= −EQm〈hn∗ , Xn〉 ≤ cnm + anm∗ , m = 1, . . . ,M.
Clearly, for m ∈ J , this inequality is the equality. Assume that there exist n and
hn ∈ Hn , an ∈ Rm such that
〈hn, En〉 − 〈an, α∗〉 > 〈hn∗ , En〉 − 〈an∗ , α∗〉,
(ρm)c
(
〈hn, Xn〉;
N∑
n=1
〈hn∗ , Xn〉
)
≤ cnm + anm, m = 1, . . . ,M.
This means that, for ∆hn = hn − hn∗ and ∆an = an − an∗ , we have
〈∆hn, En〉 > 〈∆an, α∗〉,
EQm〈∆hn, Xn〉 ≥ −∆anm, m ∈ J.
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This leads to the inequality
〈∆hn, En〉+
∑
m∈J
αm∗ EQm〈∆hn, Xn〉 > 0,
which is a contradiction.
(ii)⇒(i) Suppose that there exist hn ∈ Hn such that
N∑
n=1
〈hn, En〉 >
N∑
n=1
〈hn∗ , En〉,
ρm
( N∑
n=1
〈hn, Xn〉
)
≤ cm, m = 1, . . . ,M.
Then hn(ε) := hn∗ + ε(h
n − hn∗ ) ∈ Hn for any ε ∈ (0, 1). For ∆hn = hn − hn∗ , we have∑
n〈∆hn, En〉 > 0, and, due to the convexity of the function ε 7→ ρm
(∑
n〈hn(ε), Xn〉
)
,
N∑
n=1
EQm〈∆hn, Xn〉 = − d
dε
∣∣∣
ε=0
ρm
( N∑
n=1
〈hn(ε), Xn〉
)
≥ 0, m ∈ J.
This means that there exists n such that
〈∆hn, En〉 > −
∑
m∈J
αm∗ EQm〈∆hn, Xn〉.
For this n, set anm = anm∗ − EQm〈∆hn, Xn〉 . Then
〈hn, En〉 − 〈an, α∗〉 > 〈hn∗ , En〉 − 〈an∗ , α∗〉.
Furthermore,
(ρm)c
(
〈hn, Xn〉;
N∑
n=1
〈hn∗ , Xn〉
)
= −EQm〈hn∗ , Xn〉 − EQm〈∆hn, Xn〉
= (ρm)c
(
〈hn∗ , Xn〉;
N∑
n=1
〈hn∗ , Xn〉
)
+ anm − anm∗
≤ cnm + anm, m = 1, . . . ,M,
which is a contradiction.
In order to complete the proof, it is sufficient to show that any α∗ satisfying (ii) also
satisfies (iii). This is obvious. ✷
8 Summary and Conclusion
1. Risk measurement. Consider a firm whose portfolio has the form W =
∑N
n=1W
n .
Here W is the P&L produced by the portfolio over the unit time period ∆, which is used
as the basis for risk measurement (typically it is one day); W n is the P&L of the n-th
asset. Let X be the P&L produced by some additional asset or portfolio over the same
period.
The empirical procedure to assess Alpha V@R risk of W and the risk contribution
of X to W is:
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1. Fix α ∈ N.
2. Choose a probability measure ν on the set of natural numbers, choose the number
of trials K ∈ N, and generate independent draws (tkl; k = 1, . . . , K, l = 1, . . . , α)
from the distribution ν . A natural choice for ν is a geometric distribution.
3. Calculate the array
lk = argmin
l=1,...,α
N∑
n=1
wnkl, k = 1, . . . , K.
Here wnkl is the increment of the value of the n-th asset in the portfolio over the
time period [−tkl∆,−(tkl − 1)∆] (the current time instant is 0)1.
4. Calculate the empirical estimates of ρα(W ) and ρ
c
α(X ;W ) by the formulas:
ρe(W ) = − 1
K
K∑
k=1
N∑
n=1
wnklk ,
ρce(X ;W ) = −
1
K
K∑
k=1
xklk .
Here xkl is the realization of X (i.e. the increment of the value of the corresponding
portfolio) over the time period [−tkl∆,−(tkl − 1)∆].
Note that the same arrays (tkl) and (lk) are used for different X . If we measure
risk on the daily basis, steps 1–3 can be performed only once a day (for example, in
the night). Thus, in the morning the central desk announces the arrays (tkl) and (lk),
and when assessing the risk contribution of any trade X , any desk should simply take
the realizations of X over the corresponding intervals and insert them into the formula
for ρce . The number of operations required to generate (tkl) and (lk) is of order αNK ;
the number of operations required to calculate ρce is of order K . In particular, we need
not order the data set (which is needed for estimating V@R).
The above estimation procedure is completely non-linear. Moreover, it is completely
empirical as it uses no model assumptions on the structure of X and W .
If X =
∑J
j=1X
j is itself a big portfolio (for example, the P&L produced by a desk
of the firm), then both the theoretical risk contribution and its empirical estimate satisfy
the linearity property:
ρc
( J∑
j=1
Xj;W
)
=
J∑
j=1
ρc(Xj;W ).
The above procedure can be combined with the bootstrap technique, with obvious
changes.
A similar procedure can be performed for Beta V@R. The difference is that one
should additionally choose β ∈ {1, . . . , α − 1} and find the numbers lk1, . . . , lkβ such
that the corresponding
∑
nw
n
kl stand at the first β places (in the increasing order) among∑
nw
n
k1, . . . ,
∑
nw
n
kα . Then the empirical estimates of ρα,β(W ) and ρ
c
α,β(X ;W ) are pro-
1Of course, if the price of the n-th asset is positive by its nature (for example, the n-th asset is a
share), then one can use a finer procedure to determine wn
kl
, i.e. wn
kl
is the current value of the asset
times its relative increment over the period [−tkl∆,−(tkl − 1)∆].
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vided by
ρe(W ) = − 1
Kβ
K∑
k=1
β∑
i=1
N∑
n=1
wnklki,
ρce(X ;W ) = −
1
Kβ
K∑
k=1
β∑
i=1
xklki.
2. Factor risk measurement. The procedure to assess Alpha V@R factor risks
of W and the factor risk contributions of X to W is:
1. Fix α ∈ N.
2. Choose the main market factors Y 1, . . . , Y M affecting the risk of the portfolio. Here
Y m means the increment of the m-th factor over the unit time period.
3. Create procedures for calculating the functions fm(y) = E(X |Y m = y) and
gnm(y) = E(W n |Y m = y).
4. Choose a probability measure ν on the set of natural numbers, choose the number
of trials K , and generate independent draws (tkl; k = 1, . . . , K, l = 1, . . . , α) from
the distribution ν .
5. Calculate the array
lmk = argmin
l=1,...,α
N∑
n=1
gnm(ymkl), k = 1, . . . , K, m = 1, . . . ,M.
Here ymkl is the increment of the m-th factor over the time period
[−tkl(σm)2∆,−(tkl − 1)(σm)2∆], where σm is the current volatility of the m-th
factor (for example, the implied volatility). Instead of this time change procedure,
one can use the scaling procedure.
6. Calculate the empirical estimates of ρfα(W ; Y
m) and ρfcα (X ; Y
m;W ) by the formu-
las:
ρfe (W ; Y
m) = − 1
K
K∑
k=1
N∑
n=1
gnm
(
ymklm
k
)
, m = 1, . . . ,M,
ρfce (X ; Y
m;W ) = − 1
K
K∑
k=1
fm
(
ymklm
k
)
, m = 1, . . . ,M.
All the pleasant features of risk estimates described above remain true for factor risks.
Moreover, an important advantage of factor risks is that we can take an arbitrarily large
data set y1, . . . , yT , while the joint data set w
n
t required for ordinary risk does not exist
for large portfolios.
A similar procedure can be performed for Beta V@R. The difference is that one
should additionally choose β ∈ {1, . . . , α − 1} and find the numbers lmk1, . . . , lmkβ such
that the corresponding
∑
ng
nm(ymkl) stand at the first β places (in the increasing order)
among
∑
ng
nm(ymk1), . . . ,
∑
ng
nm(ymkα). Then the empirical estimates of ρ
f
α,β(W ; Y
m) and
ρfcα,β(X ; Y
m;W ) are provided by
ρfe (W ; Y
m) = − 1
Kβ
K∑
k=1
β∑
i=1
N∑
n=1
gnm
(
ymklm
ki
)
, m = 1, . . . ,M,
ρfce (X ; Y
m;W ) = − 1
Kβ
K∑
k=1
β∑
i=1
fm
(
ymklm
ki
)
, m = 1, . . . ,M.
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The functions gnm should not be recalculated every day (if we measure risk on a
daily basis); once computed, these functions might be used for rather a long period. Of
course, the collection of assets in the portfolio changes each day, but the main part of this
collection remains the same, so that when the (N+1)-th asset appears in the portfolio, we
should calculate gN+1,m , m = 1, . . . ,M , but we should not recalculate gnm , n = 1, . . . , N ,
m = 1, . . . ,M .
The factor risk estimation admits a multi-factor version: instead of considering
M different factor risks, we consider one risk driven by the multidimensional factor
Y = (Y 1, . . . , Y M). Alternatively, we could split the factors into M groups so that
the increment of the m-th group is a random vector, which we still denote by Y m , and
split the portfolio into M groups so that the risk of the m-th group is driven mainly by
the m-th group of factors. Then when dealing with the m-th factor risk we are consid-
ering only the m-th part of the portfolio. All the formulas remain the same with obvious
changes.
3. Comparison of various techniques. In Table 1, we compare different risk
measurement techniques proposed in this paper and several classical risk measurement
techniques (see [46; Sect. 6] for their description). Let us briefly describe this table.
All the techniques, except for one-factor risk measurement, assess the overall risk. As
shown by Example 3.11, the sum of one-factor risks need not exceed the multi-factor risk,
so that the measurement of one-factor risks might be insufficient.
For the empirical risk estimation procedure described above, one requires the joint
time series wnt for all the assets in the portfolio. However, different assets have different
durations, so that a joint time series might exist only for small portfolios or portfolios
consisting of long-living assets only. In contrast, all the other methods express the values
of the assets through the main factors, and for the factors one can get arbitrarily large
time series.
For one-factor risks we can use the time change technique described above, which
enables one to react immediately to the volatility changes. For parametric V@R and
Monte Carlo V@R, this can partially be done, but these methods require the covariance
matrix for different assets, for which we should use historic data.
The speed of computations for one-factor coherent risks, multi-factor coherent risks,
and historic V@R is approximately the same because in all these methods the main part
of computations consists in finding the values gnm(ymkl).
The methods proposed in this paper deal with coherent risk. The arguments of Sec-
tion 2 show that in many respects this is much wiser than the use of V@R.
All the methods of this paper admit simple calculation of risk contributions. For
parametric V@R, this is also possible because there exist explicit formulas for Gaussian
V@R contributions. For Monte Carlo V@R, the possibility to calculate risk contributions
depends on the choice of the probabilistic model.
All the methods, except for parametric V@R, are completely non-linear.
Monte Carlo V@R might be performed both for Gaussian and non-Gaussian models,
but for the latter ones this leads to a further decrease in the speed of computations.
The empirical risk estimation technique uses absolutely no model assumptions. As for
the factor risks and historic V@R, there are no assumptions on the probabilistic structure
of Y m , but model assumptions are used when calculating the functions fm , gnm .
As the conclusion, the best methods are: one-factor and multi-factor coherent risk
measurement. It might be reasonable to use both of them simultaneously.
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Table 1. Comparison of various risk measurement techniques. The
relative strengths of different methods are shown by the extent of shading.
4. Risk management. Two practical recommendations of this paper concerning
risk management are as follows:
1. The central management of a firm should impose the limits not on the outstanding
risks (resp., factor risks) of the desks’ portfolios, but rather on their risk contribu-
tions (resp., factor risk contributions) to the capital of the whole firm. In view of
the formulas given above, this can be done simply by announcing the arrays (tkl)
and (lk) (resp., (tkl) and (l
m
k )).
2. If the desks are allowed to trade these risk limits within the firm, then the corre-
sponding competitive optimum is in fact the global optimum for the whole firm,
regardless of the initial allocation of the risk limits.
Appendix: L0 Version of the Kusuoka Theorem
Theorem A.1. Let (Ω,F ,P) be atomless and u be a coherent utility on L0 with the
determining set D . The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) u is law invariant;
(ii) D is law invariant (i.e. if Z ∈ D and Z ′ Law= Z , then Z ′ ∈ D);
(iii) there exists a set M of probability measures on (0, 1] such that
u(X) = inf
µ∈M
uµ(X), X ∈ L0;
(iv) there exists a set M of probability measures on (0, 1] such that D = ⋃µ∈MDµ .
Proof. In essence, the reasoning will follow the lines of the proof of the L∞ -version
of the theorem borrowed from [29; Sect. 4.5].
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(i)⇒(ii) As (Ω,F ,P) is atomless, it supports a random variable X with any given
distribution Q on the real line. Then the equality u˜(Q) := u(X) correctly defines a
function on the set of distributions. By the definition,
D = {Z : Z ≥ 0, EZ = 1, and EXZ ≥ u(X) ∀X ∈ L0}
=
⋂
Q
{Z : Z ≥ 0, EZ = 1, and EXZ ≥ u˜(Q) ∀X with LawX = Q},
where the intersection is taken over all the probability measures on R. By the Hardy–
Littlewood inequality (see [29; Th. A.24]),
EX+Z ≥
∫ 1
0
qs(X
+)q1−s(Z)ds =
∫ 1
F (0)
qs(X)q1−s(Z)ds,
EX−Z ≤
∫ 1
0
qs(X
−)qs(Z)ds =
∫ 1
0
q1−s(X
−)q1−s(Z)ds = −
∫ F (0)
0
qs(X)q1−s(Z)ds,
where F is the distribution function of X . Consequently,
EXZ ≥
∫ 1
0
qs(X)q1−s(Z)ds. (a.1)
Fix Z and a probability measure Q on R. As (Ω,F ,P) is atomless, Z can be represented
as qU(Z) with a uniformly distributed on [0, 1] random variable U . Then X := q1−U (Q)
has the distribution Q (qλ(Q) is the λ-quantile of Q). Obviously,
EXZ =
∫ 1
0
qs(Q)q1−s(Z)ds.
Combining this with (a.1), we get
inf
X:LawX=Q
EZX =
∫ 1
0
qs(Q)q1−s(Z)ds.
Thus, the set {Z : EZX ≥ u˜(Q) ∀X with LawX = Q} is law invariant. Hence, D is law
invariant.
(ii)⇒(iii) The law invariance of D means that there exists a set Q of probability
measures on R+ such that D = {Z : LawZ ∈ Q} . Fix Q ∈ Q. There exists a unique
measure µ = µ(Q) on (0, 1] such that ψµ(x) = q1−x(Q), x ∈ (0, 1] (ψµ is given by (2.7)).
Clearly, µ is positive and
µ((0, 1]) =
∫
(0,1]
∫
(0,y]
y−1dxµ(dy) =
∫ 1
0
∫
[x,1]
y−1µ(dy)dx
=
∫ 1
0
q1−x(Q)dx =
∫
R+
xQ(dx) = 1.
Applying the same argument as above and recalling (2.6), we get
inf
Z:LawZ=Q
EXZ =
∫ 1
0
qs(X)q1−s(Q)ds =
∫ 1
0
qs(X)ψµ(X)ds = uµ(X), X ∈ L0. (a.2)
As a result,
u(X) = inf
Z∈D
EXZ = inf
Q∈Q
inf
Z:LawZ=Q
EXZ = inf
Q∈Q
uµ(Q)(X), X ∈ L0. (a.3)
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(iii)⇒(i) This implication follows from the law invariance of uµ .
(ii)⇒(iv) It follows from (a.2) that {Z : LawZ = Q} ⊆ Dµ(Q) . Hence,
D ⊆ ⋃
Q∈QDµ(Q) . On the other hand, if Z ∈ Dµ(Q) with some Q ∈ Q, then, by (a.3),
EXZ ≥ uµ(Q)(X) ≥ u(X), X ∈ L0,
so that, by definition, Z ∈ D . Hence, D = ⋃
Q∈QDµ(Q) .
(iv)⇒(ii) This implication follows from the law invariance of Dµ , which is seen
from (2.12). ✷
Corollary A.2. Let (Ω,F ,P) be atomless, u be a law invariant coherent utility with
the determining set D , and Y be a random vector. Then E(D|Y ) ⊆ D .
Proof. By Theorem A.1, D = ⋃µ∈MDµ with some set M of probability measures on
(0, 1]. Using representation (2.12), the convexity of the function Φµ given by (2.13), and
the Jensen inequality, we get E(Dµ |Y ) ⊆ Dµ , which yields the desired statement. ✷
The following example shows that the law invariance condition in the preceding corol-
lary is essential.
Example A.3. Let D = {Z} , where Z 6= 1. Let Y be independent of dQ/dP. Then
E(D|Y ) = {1} 6⊆ D . ✷
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